



Of More Than Usual Interest: The Taxing Problem of 
Debt Principal 
Charlene D. Luke∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Leverage is an essential but often troubling component of the U.S. 
market. The financial crisis highlighted the risks and complexity of a 
leverage web that includes flesh-and-blood people from all walks of life 
and paper people from all corners of the business and investment world. 
In the tax area, the potentially problematic incentive effects of interest 
deductibility have long engaged a wide array of tax commentators and 
policymakers. While interest deductibility rightly receives widespread 
scrutiny, a more comprehensive approach to leverage is needed. This 
Article focuses on the surprisingly complicated tax treatment of cash 
(and cash equivalent) borrowings. This Article highlights that the current 
tax treatment of debt principal used to finance business and investment 
deductions yields favorable tax timing mismatches for taxpayers and 
thereby theoretically amplifies any distortions caused by the deductibility 
of debt interest. 
The tax system’s current approach to debt-financed tax benefits re-
flects reactive responses to particular forms of tax avoidance. The current 
system’s reliance on a factor drawn from tax avoidance case law—
likelihood of repayment—has led to an inherently flawed set of tax rules. 
For example, the at-risk rules identify nonrecourse debt as problematic 
and then impose timing limitations on tax benefits financed only with 
that debt type even though potential timing distortions are embedded in 
all cash borrowings. Thus, the at-risk rules treat nonrecourse debt as 
simultaneously bona fide and suspect, yet whether an agreement consti-
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tutes bona fide debt still must be determined using a facts-and-
circumstances, case-by-case analysis. The resulting tax rules relating di-
rectly to debt principal are confusing and inconsistent. The rules also 
invite extensive tax planning, whether legitimate or avoidant. 
The main tax problems relating to debt principal—the timing dis-
tortion and the possibility of sham debt—should be addressed as distinct 
issues with priority given to the timing issue. Giving renewed attention to 
resolving the timing distortion would facilitate a comprehensive ap-
proach to debt and would also have the likely side benefit of making 
sham debt less attractive. This Article examines multiple proposals for 
directly limiting timing benefits. Solving timing distortions for even sim-
ple cash debt is quite difficult. Thus, this Article details a more accurate, 
more complex reform avenue but also suggests a simpler, rougher justice 
one as well. The more complex approach rations the use of borrowed 
basis while the simpler approach utilizes a deferral charge. In addition, 
this Article briefly reviews (and rejects) two other possibilities—treating 
all debt as lacking basis and treating cash equivalent debt as income on 
receipt. If it is not currently possible to implement broader reform pro-
posals, incremental reform that distinguishes more carefully between the 
underlying timing distortion and tax avoidance behavior could bring 
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INTRODUCTION 
Leverage is an essential but often troubling component of the U.S. 
market.1 The financial crisis highlighted the risks and complexity of a 
leverage web that includes flesh-and-blood people from all walks of life 
and paper people from all corners of the business and investment world.2 
The recent crisis will fuel economic, financial, and legal scholarship and 
debate for decades—perhaps centuries—to come.3 In the tax area, a cen-
tral concern has been whether the tax system improperly persuades tax-
payers to take leveraged positions that they would not take in the absence 
of tax incentives.4 To put it another way, the question is whether the tax 
system’s treatment of leverage causes significant and problematic eco-
nomic distortions.5 
Much of the analysis of this question focuses on the tax treatment 
of the interest on debt.6 Under current federal tax law, all or a portion of 
                                                            
 1. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution 
of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 227 (2011) (pointing out that financial services “facili-
tate productive investment up to a point” but that the U.S. financial system is “using too much debt 
[and] creating too much credit”). 
 2. Various business and investment taxpayer entities are paper people or artificial people. See 
Dana Milbank, A Ruling for the People, At Least the “Artificial” Ones, WASH. POST, July 1, 2014, at 
A02 (“Mitt Romney said it, and on Monday the Supreme Court upheld it: ‘Corporations are people, 
my friend.’”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“But it is 
important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction [that corporations are persons] is to provide 
protection for human beings.”). Video of Mitt Romney’s (in)famous comment is available at Mitt 
Romney- Corporations are People!, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2h8ujX6T0A 
(uploaded Aug. 11, 2011). 
 3. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE 
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT (2011); Blair, supra note 1; Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 253 (2014). Consider that writers across disciplines continue to analyze the Great Depres-
sion and its aftermath. See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2004); 
INTERPRETING AMERICAN HISTORY: THE NEW DEAL AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION (Aaron D. Pur-
cell ed., 2014). 
 4. See, e.g., TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi 
eds., 2012); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Deleveraging the Tax Code, 120 TAX NOTES 
1241 (2008). 
 5. This is not to suggest a causative linkage between the tax treatment of debt and the financial 
crisis. See Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi, Introduction to TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, supra note 4 (noting that “taxation and fiscal policy do not appear in the list of major culprits 
responsible for the financial crisis” but that “the tax system appears to have played a secondary 
role”). 
 6. See, e.g., TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 4; Sullivan, supra note 4. 
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interest paid on debt used to finance investment assets, business opera-
tions, and home ownership is deductible.7 The potentially problematic 
incentive effects of this deductibility have long engaged a wide array of 
tax commentators and policymakers.8 For example, proposals regularly 
emerge suggesting the reduction or elimination of the deductibility of 
home mortgage interest.9 Recently, the ability of U.S. corporations to 
deduct cross-border interest payments has drawn attention in the debate 
about corporate tax inversions.10 
While interest deductibility rightly continues to receive widespread 
scrutiny, this Article highlights the need for a more comprehensive ap-
proach to leverage. The tax issues surrounding leverage are highly varied 
and complex with key decisional frameworks—such as which financial 
obligations should be treated the same as cash debt—remaining unre-
solved.11 This Article focuses on just one aspect of the leverage web, but 
one that is foundational to crafting a more comprehensive tax approach: 
the surprisingly problematic tax treatment of simple cash borrowings.12 If 
leverage is to be addressed in a principled way by the tax system, an ob-
                                                            
 7. I.R.C. § 163 (2012). A small amount of interest on qualifying student loans is also deducti-
ble. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(F), 221. 
 8. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, 
Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1228–34 
(2010) (discussing interest deductibility); Ending the Debt Addiction: A Senseless Subsidy, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 16, 2015, at 36, available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21651220-
most-western-economies-sweeten-cost-borrowing-bad-idea-senseless-subsidy (discussing interest 
deductibility); see also sources cited infra notes 9–10. 
 9. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Ultimately Helps Few Reach 
American Dream: Recent Proposals Would Be More Equitable, 19 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 189 
(2003); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy 
for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (2010). The issue of home mortgage inter-
est deduction is only one component of the overall tax benefits afforded home ownership. See Lily 
Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187 (2013). 
 10. See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Competitiveness” Has Nothing To Do With It, 2014 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 169-6 (Sept. 2, 2014); Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of 
Corporate Expatriations, 144 TAX NOTES 473 (2014); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. 
Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an 
Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015). 
 11. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Searching for Indebtedness, 2015 TAX NOTES TODAY 33-6 
(Jan. 29, 2015). 
 12. As used in this Article, cash borrowing includes not only borrowing cash but also buying 
goods or services on credit if the value of the goods or services equals the amount of the debt (plus 
any amount paid out of pocket by the borrower). In other words, cash borrowing also includes fi-
nancing when an exchange of checks is omitted. For example, if a taxpayer buys equipment worth 
$20,000 by making a $5,000 down payment and financing $15,000, the $15,000 would be a cash 
borrowing as the term is used in this Article even if the taxpayer does not get a $15,000 check from 
lender and then write a $15,000 check to the seller. This does, however, beg the question of what to 
do if the debt is larger than the value. For a brief discussion of this problem, see infra notes 102–106 
and accompanying text. 
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vious place to start is ensuring that cash (and cash equivalent) borrow-
ings are treated accurately. 
Under well-established tax authorities, taxpayers do not include 
borrowed cash in income; they generally are, however, still able immedi-
ately to use borrowed money to finance business or investment tax bene-
fits.13 In tax parlance, taxpayers receive basis when they borrow cash, 
and they are able immediately to use that basis to generate tax benefits.14 
This opens up avenues for significant time-value-of-money benefits and 
for tax avoidance.15 Congress and the courts have acted to curtail obvious 
tax avoidance techniques that rely for power on pumped-up debt princi-
pal,16 but taxpayers’ basic ability to use borrowed money to fund deduct-
ible expenses or purchase depreciable assets remains largely intact. To 
borrow money from a banker, taxpayers must pay interest, but a taxpayer 
may, in effect, borrow deductions from the Treasury without making any 
interest-like remuneration to the government.17 
This Article emphasizes that the current tax treatment of debt prin-
cipal used to finance business and investment deductions continues to 
yield favorable tax timing mismatches for taxpayers and thereby theoret-
ically amplifies any distortions caused by the deductibility of debt inter-
est.18 The ability, in effect, to borrow basis has also proven to be a temp-
tation to taxpayers looking to accelerate deductions.19 The tax system’s 
approach to debt-financed deductions has been to deal reactively and in a 
                                                            
 13. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 48, 
362–63 (12th ed. 2011). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of 
the Traditional System Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 41 (1986); Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr., Reforming Cost Recovery Allowances for Debt Financed Depreciable Property, 29 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1029 (1985); Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a 
Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1994); George K. Yin, The Story 
of Crane: How a Widow’s Misfortune Led to Tax Shelters, in TAX STORIES 207 (Paul Caron ed., 
2003). The problems associated with reaching timing distortions have received considerable atten-
tion and have resulted in concrete changes to the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), including enact-
ment and revisions to rules for handling original issue discount, market discount, and below-market 
interest. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: 
Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REV. 565 (1983); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest 
in Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money, 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); Lawrence Lokken, The 
Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 16. I.R.C. § 465 (2012) (at-risk rules); Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048–49 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
 17. As will be explained in detail in Part I infra, borrowed cash is infused with tax basis; this 
tax basis may be used to support tax deductions immediately. 
 18. Whether and to what extent a particular tax treatment factually induces distortive behavior 
requires empirical analysis and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
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piecemeal fashion to particular avoidant behavior.20 Rather than deal di-
rectly with the timing benefits, tax statutes and regulations categorize 
debt according to likelihood of repayment and use the resulting catego-
ries to implement various restraints on taxpayer behavior.21 This Article 
recommends a renewed focus on the underlying timing temptation to 
advance a more comprehensive, principled approach to borrowing de-
ductions.22 Resolving the timing temptation requires greater attention to 
the tax concept of basis and less to the likelihood of repayment—a non-
tax concept—in determining tax consequences. 
The concept of likelihood of repayment in the tax system does, 
however, make sense when it is utilized as one factor for distinguishing 
bona fide cash (or cash equivalent) debt from sham debt.23 Tax avoiders 
are likely inclined to limit economic risk and are thus more apt to use 
structures reducing their potential for true economic costs.24 Congress 
seized on likelihood of repayment to implement a specific set of rules, 
the at-risk rules, in an effort to limit tax avoidance without the need to 
resort to case-by-case resolution.25 The at-risk rules operate by using two 
rough, proxy categories for likelihood of repayment. These categories, 
recourse debt and nonrecourse debt, persist within the at-risk rules and 
also are used in partnership taxation.26 
This use of proxies for repayment likelihood has, however, led to 
an inherently flawed set of tax rules. For example, the at-risk rules identi-
fy nonrecourse debt as problematic and then impose timing limitations 
on deductions (and credits) financed only with that debt type, even 
though potential timing distortions are embedded in all cash borrow-
                                                            
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. I.R.C. § 465 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (as amended in 2005). 
 22. During the lead up to the enactment of the at-risk rules and into the 1980s, the problem of 
debt-financed deductions received considerable attention. For examples, see supra note 15. Since 
then, the amount and complexity of debt and of business configurations have only increased. 
 23. See infra Part II. It also makes sense for purposes of distinguishing bona fide obligations 
that are still too contingent to be treated the same as cash borrowings. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 (as 
amended in 2005). 
 The term “sham,” like “tax shelter,” is a loaded one in tax law. This Article uses it to indicate 
an arrangement that is formally debt but that a court would have no trouble viewing as substantively 
lacking any economic reality. See Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s Choices for 
Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551, 558 (2013). 
 24. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX 
L. REV. 401, 405 (1989) (arguing that tax avoiders are risk averse and hence are more likely to use 
nonrecourse debt; thus, targeting nonrecourse debt will net the worst offenders). 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See I.R.C. § 465 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (as amended in 2011); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 
(as amended in 2005). 
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ings.27 Thus, the at-risk rules treat nonrecourse debt as simultaneously 
bona fide and suspect, yet whether an agreement constitutes bona fide 
debt still must be determined using a facts-and-circumstances, case-by-
case analysis.28 Perhaps not surprisingly, the current tax rules relating 
directly to debt principal are confusing and inconsistent. The rules also 
invite extensive tax planning, whether legitimate or avoidant, while they 
still formally maintain a potential timing benefit for all cash borrow-
ings.29 The main tax problems relating to debt principal—the timing dis-
tortion and the possibility of sham debt30—should instead be addressed 
as distinct issues with priority given to the timing benefits of all debt. 
Giving renewed attention to resolving the timing distortion would facili-
tate a comprehensive approach to debt and would also have the likely 
side benefit of making sham debt less attractive. 
This Article examines multiple proposals for addressing the timing 
distortion directly. As will become apparent, solving the timing distor-
tion for even simple cash debt is quite complex. Thus, this Article details 
a more accurate, more complex reform avenue but also suggests a sim-
pler, rougher justice one as well. The more complex approach rations the 
use of borrowed basis while the simpler approach utilizes a deferral 
charge. In addition, this Article briefly reviews (and rejects) two other 
possibilities—treating all debt as lacking basis and treating cash debt as 
income on receipt. If it is not currently possible to implement broader 
reform proposals, incremental reform that distinguishes more carefully 
between the underlying timing distortion and tax avoidance behavior 
could bring greater coherence to the taxing problem of debt principal. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I uses examples to explain 
the current tax treatment of debt principal and explore the potential bene-
fit to taxpayers of borrowing deductions. Part II provides a summary of 
three approaches to debt principal already embedded in the tax system: 
the at-risk rules, the subchapter S corporate debt rules, and tax partner-
ship debt rules. Part III outlines a proposal that uses features of the at-
risk rules and subchapter S rules to require taxpayers to wait to access 
the benefits of borrowed deductions. Part IV briefly considers the possi-
                                                            
 27. I.R.C. § 465 (2012). Some nonrecourse debt is permissible. See discussion of qualifying 
nonrecourse debt infra notes 125–129. 
 28. See Regents Park Partners v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3131 (1992). 
 29. For example, the Treasury continues to struggle to implement partnership tax rules relating 
to both basis assignment for debt and for allocations relating to debt. See infra notes 166–168 and 
accompanying text. 
 30. A bona fide economic arrangement labeled as debt may also be present but be better cate-
gorized as something else—as equity or as a contingent obligation, for example. See infra notes 31–
32. 
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bility of three alternative avenues for limiting access to borrowed deduc-
tions: zero basis for debt, income acceleration for debt, and nondeducti-
ble deferral payments on borrowed deductions.  
I. THE MECHANICS OF BORROWING DEDUCTIONS 
The tax advantage accorded to interest rightly raises concerns about 
overuse of leverage and about deadweight loss from avoidant manipula-
tion of the debt-equity line and the interest-principal line.31 Similar, albe-
it more variable, tax advantages stem from the current tax treatment of 
debt principal, thus amplifying the distortive potential of interest deduct-
ibility. The first section of this Part illustrates these tax advantages using 
a series of examples involving debt-financed investments. The second 
section of this Part contains a more detailed analysis of the various cash 
flows and explores how the tax treatment of the cash flow threads could 
be altered to reduce the problematic tax advantages afforded debt princi-
pal. 
A. Illustrations of Debt-Financed Deductions 
This section uses examples to explain the basic tax treatment of 
debt principal and to explore the potential for tax timing mismatches. 
Some background assumptions are required to ensure focus on debt prin-
cipal (rather than on the interest component) and to provide continuity 
across examples. Each investment is purchased with borrowed cash32 and 
                                                            
 31. The line between debt and equity is notoriously problematic. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385 (2012); 
I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in 
the New Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499 (1994); William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal 
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 
369 (1971); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1055 (2000). It is difficult (and arguably impossible) to provide a principled rationale for distin-
guishing the tax treatment of payments made to provide a return on equity from the tax treatment of 
payments made to provide a return on debt. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether 
and how to draw the line between debt and equity. 
 The Code contains fairly workable solutions to dividing principal payments from interest pay-
ments, accruing interest, and imputing interest. See I.R.C. §§ 163(e), 483, 1271–1275, 7872 (2012); 
Walter C. Cliff & Phillip J. Levine, Interest Accrual and the Time Value of Money, 34 AM. U. L. 
REV. 107 (1984); Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 15; Halperin, supra note 15; Lokken, supra note 
15. 
 32. Just as it is difficult to draw a line between debt and equity, it is also difficult to draw a line 
between basis-conferring debt and more inchoate forms of leverage, such as some of the highly 
contingent obligations found in various derivative contracts. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1, 1.752-
7 (as amended in 2005). It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the preliminary issue of 
distinguishing liabilities that provide borrowers with basis from bona fide obligations that have not 
yet provided the obligee with such basis. 
 The at-risk rules and other rules governing debt basis were formulated well before the expan-
sion of more complex leverage tools. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL 
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it should be assumed that there is no question as to whether the debt real-
ly is debt. The reader should assume that all the example investments 
provide an identical rate of return. In addition, the reader should assume 
that the annual return on each investment and the annual interest pay-
ment on the debt financing that investment exactly cancel each other out, 
taking into account not only the pre-tax amounts but also the tax on the 
return and the deductibility of the interest.33 Further, it should be as-
sumed that the creditor charges an interest rate adequate to forestall any 
application of interest imputation rules. In each example, the investment 
lasts five years, and the debt principal is repayable in full through a bal-
loon payment at the conclusion of the investment. 
 
Example 1. Investor A borrows $100,000 and places all of it into a 
simple savings account, Account Z. Investor A does not have taxable 
income upon borrowing the $100,000. Under well-established federal 
income tax principles, the borrowing is not taxable because it does not 
increase Investor A’s wealth.34 The cash is precisely offset by an obliga-
tion to repay the $100,000 at the end of the five years.35 At the end of the 
five years, Investor A closes Account Z and uses the $100,000 still in the 
account to pay off the debt principal.36 Well-established federal income 
tax principles provide that repayment of the debt principal is not deducti-
ble.37 The explanation for non-deductibility of debt principal is the mirror 
image of that for not including the original borrowing in income: The 
repayment of the debt principal does not diminish Investor A’s wealth; 
Investor A is simply returning what was borrowed.38 In this example, 
                                                                                                                                     
HISTORY OF THE WORLD 5 (2008) (noting that “[b]efore the 1980s, [derivatives] were virtually 
unknown”). 
 33. There are practical difficulties of such a precise matchup because of, for example, re-
strictions on the deductibility of interest on debt used to finance investments. See I.R.C. § 163(d). 
 34. See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (“When a taxpayer receives a loan, he 
incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some future date. Because of this obligation, the loan pro-
ceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer.”). 
 35. The present value of $100,000 due in five years is, of course, not $100,000. The creditor 
charges interest to take into account time-value-of-money considerations. From a tax point of view, 
in a business or investment context, the money to be used to pay the interest will generally have been 
taxed followed by deduction of the interest—the two matching each other economically, at least in 
broad terms. But see I.R.C. § 163(d) (limiting deduction of investment-related interest to net invest-
ment income). As described above, the examples assume adequate interest and further assume that 
the annual return and the payment of interest exactly match. 
 36. Again, it should be assumed that annual interest payments on the debt and annual return on 
Account Z cancel each other out, even after tax. 
 37. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 54 (10th 
ed. 2012). 
 38. See id.; McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1041. 
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because the borrowed cash did not change form and was maintained in a 
separate account, that relationship is readily apparent. 
 
Example 2. Investor B also borrows $100,000, and again, as pro-
vided under well-established tax principles, B does not pay taxes on any 
of the $100,000 because B has not increased her wealth.39 Investor B us-
es the borrowed money to purchase Asset Y. Imagine that a special tax 
incentive applies to Asset Y such that purchasing it gives rise to an im-
mediate tax deduction equal to its purchase price. 40  Under well-
established tax rules, Investor B will still receive the deduction even 
though the investment is paid for with borrowed funds.41 In tax jargon 
terms, Investor B has been able to borrow not only cash but also some-
thing known as tax “basis.”42 
Tax basis is a measuring tool that is needed to ensure a taxpayer is 
not taxed twice on the same income or gain and to prevent a taxpayer 
from taking more than one deduction (if one is permitted at all) for the 
same dollars.43 The tax basis concept is pervasive in the U.S. income tax 
system and is the subject of numerous complex rules.44 For purposes of 
this example, it is sufficient to know that the starting tax basis of an asset 
purchased with cash in a commercial transaction is the value of the pur-
chased asset.45 Asset cost basis is adjusted downward for deductions tied 
to that asset and, in the future, any remaining basis will provide the base-
line for measuring gain or loss on the disposition of an asset.46 Negative 
basis is, through a complex set of rules, implicitly anathema in the feder-
al income tax system.47 As a result, any downward basis adjustments will 
                                                            
 39. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307. 
 40. This may seem unusual but, in recent years, 100% bonus depreciation has been available 
for the purchase of certain assets. I.R.C. §167(k). Code section 179 still affords expensing for certain 
asset purchases. While more generous expensing and bonus depreciation expired at the end of 2014, 
these provisions may be extended again, as they were for 2014 at the end of 2014. See Tax Increase 
Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, §§ 125, 127, 128 Stat. 4010, 4016–17 (2014). 
 41. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307. As will be discussed infra Part II, the deduction may be held in 
suspension under various gatekeeper provisions such as the at-risk rules, I.R.C. § 465, or suspended 
loss rules, I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 1366(d). 
 42. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1011–1012. 
 43. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 45–46 (4th ed. 2012). 
 44. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358, 362, 704(d), 705, 1011–12, 1014–16, 1366(d), 1367. 
 45. I.R.C. § 1012; Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188 (1954). 
 46. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011, 1016. 
 47. See, e.g., Peracchi v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1998). But see MARTIN J. 
MCMAHON, JR., DANIEL L. SIMMONS & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS 96 (4th ed. 2014) (“[N]egative basis, unlike Bigfoot, does exist.”). 
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stop at zero, and starting basis acts as a maximum deduction amount.48 
Borrowing basis through the use of debt is, however, broadly available, 
essentially allowing taxpayers the same type of timing opportunities as 
would be available if the tax system allowed negative basis.49 
Through application of the basis rules discussed above, when Inves-
tor B purchased Asset Y, she took a tax basis in the asset equal to its cost 
of $100,000. The immediate deduction for the purchase price would then 
reduce Investor B’s tax basis in Asset Y to $0.50 After five years, the debt 
principal is due, and Investor B sells Asset Y to raise the necessary 
funds. Assume that the investment is still worth $100,000, and she sells it 
for that amount.51 Because Investor B’s basis is $0, her taxable gain is 
$100,000, the full amount received on the sale.52 As in the first example, 
repayment of the loan principal will not be deductible. 
In this first pair of examples, the end result may appear to be identi-
cal; both Investor A and Investor B invested for a term of years and then 
paid back the debt principal using the value of the original account or 
asset. Yet, Investor A and Investor B may have significantly different 
after-tax outcomes. The extent to which Investor B will have a better af-
ter-tax return than Investor A will depend primarily on two factors: 
(1) the differential, if any, between the tax rate applicable to the deduc-
tion and that applicable to the investment gain; and (2) the after-tax re-
turn Investor B earns by investing the tax savings obtained by immedi-
ately deducting the cost of purchasing Asset Y.53 
                                                            
 48. See I.R.C. §§ 167(c), 197(a), 1016; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The Highly Avoidable Section 
357(c): A Case Study in Traps for the Unwary and Some Positive Thoughts About Negative Basis, 16 
J. CORP. L. 1, 26–29 (1990). 
 49. Cf. McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1034–35 (discussing that debt-financed property may 
give rise to a “negative tax”). 
 50. I.R.C. § 1016. 
 51. The ability to deduct immediately the purchase price of Asset Y even though Asset Y’s end 
value does not decline from its initial value may seem overly artificial. In fact, depreciation deduc-
tions frequently outpace economic decline in value. See id. § 168; McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 
1035–39, 1046–51. In addition, bonus depreciation and immediate expensing may be available for 
many assets. See supra note 40. 
 52. I.R.C. § 1001. The amount of tax owed will depend on how Investor B was holding the 
asset and on Investor’s B’s overall rate bracket. Id. §§ 1, 1221, 1222, 1231. This example further 
assumes that no nonrecognition provision is available. See, e.g., id. § 1031 (like-kind exchanges). 
 53. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1057–75. The two factors—tax rate and after-tax 
investment return—echo the two assumptions needed for the Cary Brown theorem to hold true. 
Brown demonstrated that providing an immediate deduction for the cost of an asset would be 
equivalent to exempting the yield on a fully taxed asset purchase. E. Cary Brown, Business-Income 
Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 301–02 (1948), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 525 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959); see McMahon, Jr., supra, at 
1052. The Cary Brown theorem is generally used to demonstrate the equivalence between a pre-paid 
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A tax rate differential could emerge as a result of a change in the 
applicable rate bracket because of fluctuations in the taxpayer’s overall 
earnings, or a differential could occur because of a tax preference for a 
particular type of income stream (e.g., capital gains or exempt income).54 
Thus, the rate differential factor raises a whole host of additional lines of 
scholarly inquiry regarding various tax rate preferences inherent in the 
tax law.55 In order to keep the discussion of debt principal to a managea-
ble length, this Article focuses primarily on the timing advantage inher-
ent in the second factor: The after-tax return on investing any tax benefit 
obtained through debt-financed basis. That is, even if the taxpayer is sub-
ject to the same tax rate for both the debt-financed deduction and for the 
income available to pay the debt, there will be a present value advantage 
inherent in the ability to borrow deductions or credits.56 
For example, if the tax rate is 30% for both the deduction on the 
purchase of Asset Y and the investment gain on the sale of Asset Y, in 
                                                                                                                                     
and post-paid consumption tax. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents and Regressivity Revisited, 
24 AUSTL. TAX F. 41, 53 (2009). The theorem only holds true, however, if two assumptions are 
present: tax rates are the same throughout, and the tax savings is invested so as to equalize the pre- 
and post-paid after-tax outcomes. Id. 
 An argument could be made that the ability to enhance deductions through debt-financed ex-
pensing acts to reduce the saving disincentive theoretically present in an income tax.  See, e.g., JOEL 
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 
212–14 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing savings disincentives under income tax). That is, it could be ar-
gued that the current treatment of debt moves tax outcomes closer to those under a consumption tax. 
This Article does not take a position on the desirability of a consumption tax, but because the current 
tax treatment of debt has not been constructed to align with a consumption tax (and is far removed 
from certain consumption tax forms) the outcomes are sure to vary significantly and erratically from 
what would be the result in a planned consumption tax. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT 
FLAT 19–20 (2002) (discussing need for borrowing inclusion in the context of implementing a post-
paid consumption tax); Brown, supra, at 536 (noting that if interest on debt is deductible then imme-
diate expensing, “[i]f applied to debt-financed assets [ ] would raise investment incentives above 
their pretax level”) (emphasis added). 
 54. For a sense of the range of other types of tax reductions or exclusions for other income 
streams, see I.R.C. § 101 (life insurance exclusion); I.R.C. § 102 (gift and inheritance exclusion); 
I.R.C. § 103 (interest exclusion for certain governmental bonds); I.R.C. § 121 (exclusion for gain on 
sale of principal residence). This Article will discuss briefly the exceptions relating to cancellation of 
indebtedness. See infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text. 
 55. For discussion of the capital gains preference, see, for example, Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing 
the Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477 (2009); Richard Schmalbeck, The Uneasy 
Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the Second Best?, 48 TAX NOTES 195 (1990). This 
preference also feeds into a broader debate about unequal distributions of wealth. See THOMAS 
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). Code sec-
tion 1014 provides a fair-market-value basis for the assets, thereby exacerbating the potential for a 
large tax rate differential. I.R.C. § 1014.  For example, an asset that would otherwise have generated 
a tax gain could be held until death then sold at no income tax gain by the estate to pay the debt.  
This could be viewed as a tax rate differential example or as the ultimate deferral mechanism. To 
manage the discussion, this Article classifies section 1014 as relating to the rate differential problem. 
 56. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1069–70. 
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absolute value terms the $30,000 tax reduction from deducting $100,000 
and the $30,000 tax owed from earning $100,000 exactly offset one an-
other. Because of Investor B’s ability to take the deduction five years 
before recognizing the investment gain, Investor B will, however, have 
five years to invest the $30,000 tax reduction obtained from the bor-
rowed deduction. $30,000 invested at 5% compound interest would be 
worth roughly $38,400 at the end of 5 years.57 If the earnings on this side 
investment are not taxed until the end of 5 years,58 a 30% tax on the 
$8,400 increase would be $2,520 for a total $35,880 after-tax amount.59 
After payment of the $30,000 tax on the gain from selling Asset Y, In-
vestor B would have $5,880 after-tax to pocket.60 By way of contrast, 
Investor A would not have any after-tax increase derived from investing 
the tax saved through a borrowed deduction. It is Investor B’s ability to 
borrow current deductions while delaying paying taxes on the offsetting 
income that has the potential to yield tax timing benefits. 
 
Example 3. Consider next Investor C, who, like Investor B, also 
purchases Asset Y using $100,000 of borrowed funds and then immedi-
ately deducts the $100,000 purchase price. Investor C, however, decides 
he does not want to sell Asset Y at the end of five years even though, as a 
result, he will not have sufficient cash flow to pay the debt principal due. 
Investor C is not insolvent in the tax sense; he simply does not want to 
part with any assets to pay off the debt. Investor C will, in the long run, 
have the same absolute value result as Investor B because either the 
lender will foreclose on Asset Y or the debt will eventually be cancelled. 
Without getting too far into the technical details, either event will, ulti-
mately, cause Investor C to have $100,000 of income.61 The time horizon 
                                                            
 57. See DODGE, FLEMING & PERONI, supra note 43, at 731 (compound interest table). 
 58. Because appreciation in value is not taxed until a sale, exchange, or other similar realiza-
tion event, it is quite possible to invest in an appreciating asset while maintaining control over when 
the appreciation is taxed. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 
57 TAX L. REV. 355, 356–60 (2004). A taxpayer able to hold the asset until death will grant the 
recipient of that asset a basis stepped up to the asset’s fair market value. As a result, the appreciation 
accruing during the decedent taxpayer’s lifetime would avoid all income tax. I.R.C. § 1014. See 
supra note 55. 
 59. Only the increase would be taxed because of the ability of the taxpayer to offset the amount 
realized on the sale of the investment with basis. I.R.C. § 1001. 
 60. Its present value in the year of taking out the loan would be approximately $4,610, again 
assuming a 5% discount rate with annual compounding. See DODGE, FLEMING & PERONI, supra note 
43, at 732 (present value table). 
 61. If the property is foreclosed on and is worth the full $100,000 debt principal owed, the 
taxpayer will have $100,000 of gain because basis would be $0. See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 
308–10 (1983); Gehl v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 784, 785–86 (1994). If, instead, the property is worth less 
than $100,000 at foreclosure and the debtor continues to have personal liability, any debt not paid for 
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between the original loan and the ultimate earning of the offsetting in-
come may, however, be significantly stretched out, with the extent of the 
delay depending on state foreclosure rules and the terms of the loan.62 As 
the length of time between the tax deduction and the tax inclusion in-
creases, the more likely it is that the taxpayer will reap the benefits of a 
tax timing mismatch;63 the taxpayer simply will have more time to invest 
the original tax savings from the borrowed tax deduction. 
 
Example 4. Sole Proprietor D borrows $100,000 in order to pay her 
employees. Once again, the receipt of the loan principal is not treated as 
income, but the costs of paying reasonable wages will be deductible by 
Proprietor D whether or not she pays them with borrowed funds.64 Alt-
hough the term “basis” is more commonly used in connection with the 
acquisition of specific assets or groups of assets rather than in connection 
with the payment of expenses, the same concept is at work. Proprietor D 
receives borrowed dollars, and those borrowed dollars are treated the 
same as earned dollars for purposes of determining her tax deduction for 
paying her employees. When Proprietor D repays the debt principal at 
the end of five years, the money used for the repayment will likely have 
been earned over time through the operation of the business. The repay-
ment itself is nondeductible, but earning the $100,000 needed for repay-
ment will have been taxed. 
This example illustrates that earning the money to be used for re-
payment may not happen all at once as in the previous examples, but in-
stead may occur over time, thereby lessening the timing mismatch be-
tween the borrowed deductions and the income offset. This will, of 
                                                                                                                                     
through the foreclosure will (1) have to be paid through other earned dollars, (2) discharged by the 
creditor directly yielding cancellation of indebtedness income, or (3) discharged through operation 
of law (e.g., if the creditor is unable to collect before the expiration of any applicable statute of limi-
tation), again yielding cancellation of indebtedness income. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108; Gehl, 102 
T.C. at 789–90. The value assigned to the property in the foreclosure proceedings and applied 
against the debt may, however, be less (often considerably less) than the market value of the proper-
ty; as a result, the example provides only a simplified version of the facts and analysis that would be 
required in a real-world foreclosure. 
 For nonrecourse-debt foreclosure, the value of the property is irrelevant; the full amount of the 
debt will go into calculating the gain (or loss) on the foreclosure. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317. If the debtor 
is allowed to keep the property, the debt, whether recourse or nonrecourse, could be directly dis-
charged by the creditor or eventually cancelled through operation of law, with either eventually 
resulting in cancellation of indebtedness income. See Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. 
 62. Debt principal would, of course, not be the only money at issue. But, for the sake of main-
taining the focus on debt principal, assume that any additional penalties, interest, and/or foreclosure 
costs will still exactly equal the annual return on Asset Y. 
 63. See Coven, supra note 15, at 68. 
 64. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). 
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course, also be true as to many debt-financed asset purchases; not only 
may the income for repayment be earned closer in time to the deductions, 
but the deductions themselves may instead be taken over period of time 
instead of all at once.65 The opportunity for tax timing savings may be 
substantial or it may be nonexistent depending on the use to which the 
debt is put, the available means of investing any tax savings, and the ori-
gins and timing of accumulating the nonborrowed basis.66 The ability of 
taxpayers to repay debt with money that is traceable to newly borrowed 
cash instead of to newly earned basis will increase the variability be-
tween taxpayers of the timing benefit.67 
Although this Article’s primary focus is on the above illustrated 
timing benefit rather than on any tax rate differential, one tax benefit 
provided to bankrupt and insolvent debtors is particularly relevant to debt 
and also has significant bearing on the issue of timing.68 To illustrate, 
consider what will happen if Proprietor D fails to pay off the debt princi-
pal; like Investor C, she will eventually have income in the amount of the 
unpaid debt principal. Assume, however, that unlike Investor C, Proprie-
tor D is unable to repay the debt because her business has taken a sudden 
downturn. Assume further that Proprietor D has filed for bankruptcy, and 
the debt is discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. In such a situation, 
Proprietor D will not have to pay tax on the $100,000 of debt discharge 
income.69 
The exclusion is not entirely free; she must reduce her other tax at-
tributes, including tax basis in other assets owned by Proprietor D.70 In 
theory, the reduction of tax attributes will mean that, in the future, Pro-
prietor D will have higher taxable income through, for example, reduced 
depreciation deductions or higher gain on the sale of assets. The reduc-
tion will have the effect of further delaying the time for reconciling any 
                                                            
 65. Although expensing is often available, see supra note 40, it is still more common to have a 
cost recovery period that extends over a period of years. I.R.C. § 168(c) (showing recovery periods 
for tangible assets ranging from three to fifty years); I.R.C. § 197 (requiring cost recovery period of 
fifteen years applicable to most amortizable intangibles). 
 66. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1079 (noting variability of debt-financed tax benefits). 
 67. See id. 
 68. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)–(B). The Code also provides additional exclusions in section 108, but 
these are not explored in this Article. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C)–(E) (qualified farm indebtedness, 
qualified real property business indebtedness, qualified principal residence indebtedness). For a 
discussion of Code section 108 and its history, see Howard E. Abrams, Partnership COD Income 
and Other Debt Issues, 126 TAX NOTES 845 (2010); Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lum-
ber: The Many Faces of Discharge of Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 137 (Paul Caron ed., 
2003). For a more general discussion of the intersection of tax and bankruptcy law, see Diane 
Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy’s Corporate Tax Loophole, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2273 (2014). 
 69. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A). 
 70. I.R.C. § 108(b). 
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borrowed deductions with an offsetting inclusion.71 Thus, the reduction 
of tax attributes will have the effect of enhancing the tax timing benefit. 
Frequently, however, full tax attribute reduction simply does not occur. 
In that case, the borrowed deductions attributable to the discharged debt 
will never be matched with an offsetting inclusion of new basis. 
Full tax attribute reduction is unlikely because the reduction is 
made at a single point in time.72 Thus, even if at the reduction time a tax-
payer has few (or zero) tax attributes, there is no mechanism for carrying 
the required reduction into future time periods when the taxpayer may 
have an increased supply of tax attributes.73 For example, if Proprietor D 
has $100,000 of debt discharged in bankruptcy but has only $50,000 of 
reducible tax attributes at the testing date, those tax attributes will be re-
duced to $0, but the additional $50,000 needed to match the original 
$100,000 borrowed deduction will never be required. In addition, bank-
rupt and insolvent taxpayers are eligible for a more generous tax attribute 
reduction rule when it comes to property basis.74 
The inclusion of income on failure to repay a debt is generally ex-
plained as following from the original exclusion for the borrowing.75 
What had not been an accession to wealth because it was offset by a re-
payment obligation becomes such an accession when the taxpayer keeps 
the money.76 This Article aims to suggest a slightly different rationale: 
the income resulting from failure to repay a debt can also be explained in 
terms of the assurance it provides that borrowed basis will ultimately be 
matched by nonborrowed basis, even if that happens much later and only 
at failure to repay. This Article will take as a working assumption that 
the bankruptcy and insolvency exclusions, including the leaky tax attrib-
                                                            
 71. See supra Part I Example 3 and accompanying discussion. 
 72. I.R.C. §§ 108(b)(4), 1017(a). 
 73. Taxpayers may be able to plan for this by using up tax attributes before the testing date or 
delaying the receipt of new tax attributes until after the testing date. See Gregory E. Stern, Tax As-
pects of Restructuring Financially Troubled Businesses, 541-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income, § 
II.G (2015). Such planning is made considerably easier by the statutory rule that tax attributes are 
measured and reduced only after the tax has been determined for the year of the discharge. I.R.C. 
§ 108(b)(4)(A). 
 74. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2). These taxpayers may be able to avoid reducing aggregate property 
basis to zero through application of a liability floor formula. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b)(3) (as 
amended in 2006) (reduction is not to exceed excess of (1) aggregate property basis plus money held 
after the discharge over (2) the aggregate liabilities remaining after the discharge). In effect, this 
formula permits taxpayers to retain borrowed basis to the extent of any debt remaining after the 
discharge. 
 75. See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 37, at 54. 
 76. See supra Part I Example 1. 
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ute reduction rules, can be justified in terms of policies outside of the tax 
law, such as the “fresh start” goal inherent in a bankruptcy discharge.77 
Consideration of this web of rules and exceptions suggests that the 
more likely debt is to be repaid, the more likely it is that any borrowed 
basis will eventually be matched by offsetting new basis. Likelihood of 
repayment thus may seem intuitively like a useful trait for crafting and 
organizing tax rules dealing with debt principal.78 Indeed, that is what the 
current tax system tends to do; in multiple areas, additional or distinct 
rules are imposed when the characteristics of a particular debt suggest it 
is one that a taxpayer may be more willing to walk away from without 
paying.79 For example, the at-risk rules, discussed in greater detail be-
low,80 are organized around proxies for likelihood of repayment, and the 
Supreme Court has explained that the ability to borrow basis is appropri-
ate in light of the taxpayer’s obligation to repay.81 This Article argues 
that while organizing tax rules around the characteristics of a taxpayer’s 
repayment obligation may halt some of the abusive and avoidant use of 
borrowed deductions,82 such a system deals with the timing advantages 
of borrowed basis in only a limited, haphazard way. On the other hand, 
dealing directly with the timing advantage has the potential to curb abu-
sive behavior more comprehensively as a collateral consequence. 
The source of the timing advantage is revealed through close exam-
ination of the four potential cash flows related to debt83: (1) receipt of 
loan proceeds; (2) use of loan proceeds; (3) earning (or otherwise amass-
ing) the funds needed for repayment; and (4) actual repayment of loan 
principal.84 The tax treatment as to each of these four strands can be 
summarized as follows: (1) the receipt of loan proceeds is not included in 
income but (2) the use of borrowed dollars is treated the same as earned 
                                                            
 77. Whether bankruptcy laws provide such a fresh start is highly debatable. See ELIZABETH 
WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 123–62 (2003). The tax rules raise 
equity concerns but full discussion will have to wait for another article. 
 78. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1057 (“There is nothing, however, to indicate that the 
tax bias in favor of leveraged depreciable assets was created by design. It is, rather, the result of the 
evolution and growth of the income tax.”). 
 79. See infra Part II. 
 80. See infra Part II. 
 81. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983). 
 82. See Shaviro, supra note 24, at 405 (arguing that tax avoiders are risk averse and hence are 
more likely to use nonrecourse debt; thus targeting nonrecourse debt will net the worst offenders). 
 83. Additional examples and variations could, of course, be proffered, but all would tinker with 
one or more of these cash flows. And it perhaps goes without saying that real-life cost recovery is 
much more complicated than that utilized in the examples in this Article. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 
179, 197 (2012). 
 84. Of course, actual cash may or may not be passed back and forth. The result is the same if 
the taxpayers forgo exchanging checks with each other. See Coven, supra note 15, at 66–67. 
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dollars for purposes of computing deductions and asset basis. The tax-
payer will be under an obligation to repay the debt, thereby triggering 
plans for repayment in the form of (3) funds from taxable or nontaxable 
sources. To put these potential sources of repayment in terms of basis, 
over time, earned basis, gifted basis, or newly borrowed basis will be 
amassed equal to the original borrowed basis amount. The (4) repayment 
itself will not give rise to any deduction. 
Looking at debt principal in this fashion conceptually separates the 
income exclusion for borrowed money from the borrowing of basis. The 
tax system contains multiple situations whereby taxpayers can realize 
in-kind wealth accessions without having to pay current tax on the acces-
sion but without obtaining a corresponding basis increase.85 If denying 
current basis is appropriate for certain unrecognized wealth accessions, it 
is surely possible to separate the treatment of basis from an event that is a 
non-wealth accession. 
Similarly, repayment of debt principal can be viewed as separate 
from repaying borrowed basis. That is, the nondeductibility of debt prin-
cipal repayment is not what squares the original basis borrowing; instead, 
it is the taxpayer’s earning (or other receipt) of basis-laden dollars avail-
able for paying the debt principal that offsets the original basis borrow-
ing.86 Isolating the basis timing distortion from the accession to wealth 
arguments can be used to design reform; this Article will explore the de-
tails of potential specific reforms in later sections.87 
B. Why Fix Borrowed Basis? 
Creditors require debtors to pay interest for the use of borrowed 
money, but the tax system does not require payment for the use of bor-
rowed basis. Because of the very real opportunities for tax avoidance 
associated with borrowed basis, the tax system has had to respond. These 
responses have, however, produced a jumble of reactive, inconsistent 
provisions that are difficult for the government to administer and that 
generate deadweight costs as taxpayers spend resources to follow (or 
strategically avoid) the limitations.88 The tax system lacks a coherent, 
                                                            
 85. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358, 1031. 
 86. Cf. McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1106–07 (proposing solution that draws on the rate of 
loan amortization). 
 87. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 88. See infra Part II. 
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comprehensive approach to borrowed basis, even though such borrowing 
is pervasive.89 
Although the set of rules dealing with debt principal is internally 
inconsistent, one common theme emerges: The rules tend to divide the 
universe of loans into only two basic categories, recourse and nonre-
course.90 The tax system then uses these categories to make assumptions 
about the taxpayer’s likelihood of repayment.91  Finally, likelihood of 
repayment, as filtered through the categories of recourse and nonre-
course, is used to set some boundaries on the use of borrowed basis. The 
details will be explored in a later section.92 At this stage, the critical point 
is that even if one would prefer to target only tax avoidance rather than 
run-of-the-mill timing mismatches, the current system fails. The division 
of tax-world debt into two categories is problematic given the numerous 
nontax economic arrangements and nontax prioritization rules, such as 
those embodied in secured transactions codes and bankruptcy rules.93 
Sophisticated, wealthy taxpayers are more likely to have the resources to 
structure arrangements to obtain both the desired economic arrangement 
and the desired tax classification. 
There are, of course, tax standards that require a focus on the sub-
stance rather than on the form of debt financing,94 but such standards are 
difficult to administer, particularly in this area where it may be difficult 
for government actors to uncover the true economics of a transaction.95 
An approach that focuses directly on the underlying benefit would limit 
the need for the tax system to categorize debt (though, admittedly, it 
would not alleviate the problem of figuring out what constitutes outright 
                                                            
 89. For other commentators making this point, see, for example, Patricia A. Cain, From Crane 
to Tufts: In Search of a Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1 (1982); Coven, supra note 15; McMahon, supra note 15; Yin, supra note 15. 
 90. See infra notes 108–112 and accompanying text for definitions of these two types. 
 91. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part II, the at-risk rules, for example, apply only to 
nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt while the Estate of Franklin line of cases addresses sham debt more 
directly. 
 92. The details of which will be explored infra Part II. 
 93. Perusal of the table of contents of any casebook devoted to Article 9 will give some sense 
of the multitude of rules. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH ix-xxx (7th ed. 2011). 
 94. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (2012) (requiring analysis of guarantees, stop loss arrangements, and 
other similar arrangements in determining whether a taxpayer is at risk); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (as 
amended in 2006) (requiring evaluation of facts and circumstances to determine whether partner has 
economic risk of loss, though then providing generous assumption regarding meeting of obliga-
tions); Section 707 Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 Fed. Reg. 4826 (proposed Jan. 30, 
2014) (attempting to import more reality into the difference between partnership recourse and part-
nership nonrecourse debt). 
 95. Attempts to do so are also rebuffed. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text for 
discussion of proposed partnership recourse debt regulations. 
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sham debt96). The current, sloppy debt-categorization system leads to 
manipulation of the categories and the usual under- or over-inclusiveness 
problem present in poorly designed anti-avoidance rules.97 
For taxpayers that are not engaged in tax avoidance, the ability to 
borrow basis should be part of the discussion regarding the tax system’s 
incentivizing of debt financing. The tax system should not privilege one 
form of investment over another (at least not in the absence of compel-
ling reasons to use tax law to attempt to change behavior).98 In the case 
of financing, it is well accepted that the concepts of debt and equity pre-
sent a false dichotomy.99 Rather, there is a continuum of economic strat-
egies for financing business and making investments; attempting to im-
pose tax consequences based on artificial, manipulable distinctions is 
highly problematic. This Article does not aim to solve the debt-equity 
conundrum but argues that the timing advantage resulting from borrow-
ing basis contributes to distortive incentives for taxpayers engaged in 
run-of-the-mill business and investment decisions.100 
                                                            
 96. See discussion of the sham debt problem infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., Charlene D. Luke, Beating the “Wrap”: The Agency Effort to Control Wrapa-
round Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX REV. 129, 184–94 (analyzing particular set of anti-
avoidance rules relating to certain insurance products). 
 98. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 53, at 131. 
 99. See supra note 31. 
 100. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1075–98. Although the ability to borrow basis does 
confer an advantage, see supra Part I.A, the scope of the incentive should not be overstated. Equity 
financing also receives various tax-related benefits. Business entities are generally able to raise 
equity capital in a manner that is tax-free to both the entity and to the equity owners. See I.R.C. 
§§ 351, 368, 721 (2012); see also Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60 
(2011). Assets contributed to a business entity in such tax-free transactions will, however, enter the 
business with the same basis that the taxpayer had in the asset. See I.R.C. §§ 362, 723. That is, asset 
contribution is not an opportunity for the business to borrow new basis but only affords it the oppor-
tunity to utilize contributed basis. A doubling of basis is also created because the equity owner will 
also have a basis in her equity position. This basis doubling effect has given rise to avoidance tech-
niques, which have been the subject of congressional and judicial intervention. See I.R.C. §§ 362(e), 
704(c)(1)(C). 
 Corporations do, however, enjoy an additional advantage; a corporation that pays for services 
or assets with its own stock in a transaction that is taxable to the other party will not itself be taxed 
and will also be able to take a market value basis in purchased assets or a market value deduction in 
the case of services. I.R.C. § 1032; see Neil R. Blecher, Section 1032: Are We There Yet?, 2 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 307 (2006). Nontax constraints likely keep a corporation from simply paying for 
everything with its own stock to avoid a tax, but the availability of this rule may temper the incentive 
for corporations to borrow basis. For example, management may want to assert a particular form of 
control; shareholders may be concerned about dilution; or vendors and service providers may be 
unwilling to be paid in stock. See Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
701 (2011) (discussing management decisions regarding whether to issue new stock). For a discus-
sion of nontax frictions, see, for example, Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Fric-
tions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057 (2013); David M. Schizer, Frictions 
as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 (2001). Of course, the interest deduc-
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Taxpayers’ ability to borrow basis contributes both to tax avoidance 
and to incentivizing debt. Quantifying the contributions in each area 
would be highly difficult, if not impossible. Yet, the current structure of 
inconsistent and reactive rules for dealing with debt principal is becom-
ing untenable, as recent efforts to rein in partnership debt and corporate 
multinational debt suggest. 101  This Article recommends taking a step 
back from the current structure to look more closely at the underlying 
source of the distortion; this Article then outlines multiple possible ave-
nues for broad-based reform. Even if a comprehensive solution is not on 
the legislative horizon, paying more attention to the mechanics of the 
temptation to borrow basis may yield better incremental anti-avoidance 
rules than those currently in place. The next Part details some of those 
anti-avoidance rules before moving to potential choices for reform. 
II. A TOUR OF THE AT-RISK RULES AND PASS-THROUGH ENTITY DEBT 
The most obvious way to make evasive or avoidant use of the abil-
ity to borrow deductions is to engage in sham borrowing (evasion) or 
near-sham borrowing (avoidance).102 In the simplest approach, a taxpayer 
could borrow a larger amount than necessary to buy an asset that pro-
vides deductions. For example, a taxpayer could buy an asset whose cost 
is immediately tax deductible and whose value is $100,000 but purport to 
purchase it with $200,000 of debt financing and claim a $200,000 deduc-
tion. A veneer of respectability could be added by finding a lender will-
ing to create jointly a large paper debt subject to a tacit understanding 
that only a portion of the debt is plausibly real. The easiest way for two 
parties to use a formal debt as cover for a tax avoidant purpose would be 
for the lender to take a secured interest in the purchased asset on which 
the lender could foreclose—thereby protecting the lender for the “real” 
debt portion103—and for the taxpayer to have no personal liability to re-
                                                                                                                                     
tion is in itself still a distorting incentive because the returns a corporation pays on equity are not 
deductible. See also McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1081–83. 
 101. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
 102. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 53, at 173–74; Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the 
Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
953, 1001–02 (2004) (discussing distinction between “illegitimate evasion and legitimate avoid-
ance”). 
 103. “Real” is in quotes because, from the taxpayer’s view, if the debt is greater than the fair 
market value of the asset there is no reason to ever make payments on such a debt; there is also little 
reason to invest in the property purchased because, if it is plausibly held for investment, depreciation 
deductions will be available even on a see-through building. Whether the codified economic sub-
stance doctrine would reach such a debt is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the 
codified doctrine, see Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s Choices for Economic 
Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551 (2013). 
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pay the debt—thereby protecting the taxpayer if (when!) the asset’s value 
at foreclosure turned out to be insufficient to cover the debt principal.104   
Government actors did not sit idly by as taxpayers aggressively 
made use of similar arrangements to increase borrowed deductions.105 
For the most fraudulent variations, courts eventually had little trouble 
holding that arrangements of this type should be disregarded as substan-
tive shams.106 Even as cases were winding their way through audits and 
court proceedings, Congress added and then expanded rules in an attempt 
to bring legislative certainty in this area; Congress framed the new 
rules—the “at-risk” rules—so that they would have their greatest effect 
on deductions financed through one category of debt: nonrecourse 
debt.107 
In tax parlance, a debt as to which the creditor’s only remedy is 
foreclosure or repossession is a nonrecourse debt.108 Because the particu-
                                                            
 104. See Shaviro, supra note 24, at 405 (discussing the role of risk aversion in explaining the 
use of nonrecourse debt in tax shelters). A commercial, U.S. lender would be less likely to accom-
modate such a tax avoidance scheme, which is likely why the at-risk rules contain exceptions relat-
ing to qualified, nonrecourse debt borrowed from certain sources and on certain terms. See infra 
notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
 105. The Internal Revenue Service, for example, issued informal rulings tied specifically to the 
use by limited partners of nonrecourse debt and to maintain its position that only bona fide debt 
could give rise to basis. See Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200; Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 C.B. 394; 
Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59 (emphasizing that acquiescence in a taxpayer-favorable case could 
be relied on only “in situations where it is clear that the property has been acquired at its fair market 
value in an arm’s length transaction creating a bona fide purchase and a bona fide debt obligation”). 
See also STAFF OF J. COMMITTEE OF TAX’N, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1976, (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT], 
available at 1976 WL 352398 (discussing nonrecourse debt tax shelters). 
 106. See e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Marcus v. 
Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971); May v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 279 (1972). In one 
case, a circuit court allowed basis for nonrecourse debt up to the fair market value of the property. 
Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Comm’r, 863 F.2d 263, 276–77 (3d Cir. 1988). Several courts have 
disagreed with the decision, and no other circuit court has followed the Pleasant Summit case. See 
Hildebrand v. Comm’r, 967 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1992); Lukens v. Comm’r, 945 F.2d 92, 98–99 
(5th Cir. 1991); Lebowitz v. Comm’r, 917 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1990). The Tax Court has, how-
ever, allowed basis for a large nonrecourse debt when other hallmarks of tax avoidance were absent. 
See Regents Park Partners v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3131 (1992). 
 107 . Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat. 1520, 1531; see 
EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT, supra note 105, at 2 (“[I]ndividuals were combining provi-
sions of the law, or leveraging them through nonrecourse borrowings, in a way which multiplied 
severalfold any possible advantages intended by Congress. Such activities reduce citizens’ respect 
for the income tax and represent an inefficient allocation of resources.”); U.S. v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 
557, 568 (2013) (discussing relevance of Joint Committee on Taxation Reports);  see also Cole 
Barnett, United States v. Woods and the Future of the Tax Blue Book as a Means of Penalty Avoid-
ance and Statutory Interpretation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1791 (2014). 
 108. Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. Tax law does, however, recognize that limited liability 
for the debt of tax partnerships is nonrecourse as to the partners even if a creditor has formal reme-
dies against the entity beyond foreclosure on specific assets. As will be briefly discussed infra, for 
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lar tax shelters of concern to Congress utilized nonrecourse debt, it must 
have seemed self-evident to use this debt category in constructing the 
at-risk rules.109 Debt that is other than nonrecourse is instead termed re-
course debt, even if the creditor’s ability to get at taxpayer assets may 
actually be lower because of the operation of nontax prioritization 
rules.110 So long as the creditor has a remedy besides foreclosure—even 
if the creditor does not have foreclosure as an option because the debt is 
unsecured—the debt is recourse.111 The tax law simply does not further 
categorize debt into more nuanced layers.112 
The nonrecourse and recourse categories roughly distinguish more 
suspect debt from less suspect debt, but the at-risk rules still require a 
preliminary determination that a particular debt is bona fide and not 
merely a sham economic arrangement.113 As a result, the case law decid-
ed before implementation of the at-risk rules remains good law,114 and 
the at-risk rules only indirectly operate to limit the original problem of 
sham debt.115  The at-risk rules use the nonrecourse debt label as a proxy 
for repayment likelihood to impose a timing rule appropriate to all debt. 
                                                                                                                                     
tax partnerships, the method for assigning borrowed basis among the partners turns primarily on 
whether the debt is categorized as recourse or nonrecourse at the partner level. 
 A tax partnership would include domestic multimember limited liability companies that have 
not elected a different tax status. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2006). Single-
member LLCs are treated as disregarded entities, unless an election is made. Id. The unintended 
consequences of this default entity classification regime (the “check-the-box rules”) are still unfold-
ing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k) (as amended in 2006) (applying distinct rule for allocating bor-
rowed basis to disregarded entities); Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the 
Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2005); 
Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185 (2004). 
 109. See EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT, supra note 105, at 35 (“The opportunity to 
deduct tax losses in excess of the amount of the taxpayer’s economic risk had arisen under prior law 
primarily through the use of nonrecourse financing . . . .”). The Joint Committee’s explanation of the 
1976 Act also suggests a congressional concern that taxpayers were being led into the tax shelters 
without regard to potential long-term economic consequence. Id. (“Taxpayers, ignoring the possible 
tax consequences in later years, can be led into investments which are otherwise economically un-
sound and which constitute an unproductive use of investment funds.”); see also McMahon, Jr., 
supra note 15, at 1034; Yin, supra note 15, at 250. 
 110. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra 93, at 3–20 (discussing unsecured creditors). 
 111. For example, unsecured credit card debt is recourse debt, but a debt secured by a valuable 
office building would be nonrecourse if the creditor’s remedies were limited to foreclosing on the 
building. 
 112. Tax partnership debt categorization rules do draw a distinction between partner nonre-
course debt and partnership nonrecourse debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (as amended in 2005). 
 113. As perhaps does not need to be restated, it must also be decided whether there is bona fide 
economic arrangement other than cash equivalent debt—such as equity or a contingent obligation. 
 114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 115. Sham debt is more likely to be formally structured as nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt.  
See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, a debt’s label becomes highly significant, which introduces 
the potential for gamesmanship and the need for careful planning.116 
The at-risk rules specify that a taxpayer’s deductions relating to a 
particular activity are limited to the amount that the taxpayer has “at 
risk” in the activity.117 The taxpayer’s at-risk amount for any particular 
activity will roughly equal (1) the taxpayer’s basis in the assets of the 
activity, (2) plus the net income produced by the activity during the year, 
(3) minus nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt allocable to the activity, and 
(4) minus amounts already deducted or distributed.118  Originally, the 
at-risk rules applied only to five specific activities that had been viewed 
as the most popular vehicles for tax avoidance; real estate, for instance, 
was not in the original five.119 Currently, the rules apply to all business or 
investment activities of individuals and closely-held corporations. 120 
Other business entities are not subject to the rules, but individuals who 
own interests in tax partnerships and S corporations are subject to the 
at-risk rules with respect to their interests in these entities.121 
The heart of the at-risk rules relates to debt principal. The rules 
specify that borrowed amounts increase a taxpayer’s at-risk amount only 
to the extent the taxpayer “is personally liable for the repayment of such 
amounts” or “has pledged property, other than property used in such ac-
tivity, as security for such borrowed amount.”122 For example, assume a 
taxpayer purchases an interest in a partnership using $0 of his own mon-
ey and borrowing $100 in such a way that the taxpayer is not personally 
liable on the debt. The taxpayer would still have a $100 basis in the ac-
tivity but his at-risk amount would be $0. As a result, any deductions 
                                                            
 116. The at-risk rules do embed a substance-over-form requirement.  See infra notes 130–131 
and accompanying text. 
 117. I.R.C. § 465 (2012). Similar rules limit certain tax credits. I.R.C. § 49. 
 118. I.R.C. § 465(b), (d). 
 119. The five historic activities were “(A) holding, producing, or distributing motion picture 
films or video tapes, (B) farming . . . (C) leasing any section 1245 [non-real estate] property . . . (D) 
exploring for, or exploiting, oil and gas resources as a trade or business or for the production of 
income, or (E) exploring for, or exploiting, geothermal deposits.” I.R.C. § 465(c)(1). For a more 
detailed account of the evolution of the at-risk rules, see Lisa Marie Starczewski, At-Risk Rules, 550-
3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income (2015). 
 120. Legislation expanding the rules to activities other than real property was enacted in 1978. 
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2763. The real property exception was 
removed by 1986 legislation. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503, 100 Stat. 2085, 
2243. But an exception for qualified nonrecourse financing relating to real estate activities was add-
ed. Id. For a discussion of the 1986 reform as it relates to real estate borrowed basis shelters, see 
JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 10, 140 (1987). 
 121. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1)(A); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24, 44 Fed. Reg. 32242 (June 5, 1979). 
 122. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2). 
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allocated by the partnership to the taxpayer would be suspended by the 
at-risk rules.123 The at-risk rules thus operate to restrict the timing of bor-
rowed deductions. 
The at-risk rules, however, are not as strong as they may first ap-
pear. An exception allows taxpayers to avoid reducing their at-risk 
amounts for qualified nonrecourse financing.124 The exception only ap-
plies “in the case of an activity of holding real property” and the debt 
must be secured only by “real property used in such activity.”125 Nonre-
course debt used in a qualifying activity must be obtained only through 
certain lenders and on certain terms.126 The overall characteristic of the 
approved lenders is that they appear to be ones less likely to act as ac-
commodation parties to a tax shelter transaction; in other words, the re-
quirements relating to lenders and loan terms help increase the likelihood 
that the debt is real.127 The limitation relating to real property may also 
have been seen as assuring higher quality collateral, making the debt 
                                                            
 123. I.R.C. § 465(a), (d). 
 124. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(6). 
 125. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(6)(A). Some incidental personal property holdings and services are 
tolerated. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(6)(E); Treas. Reg. § 1.465-27(b)(2)(i) (1998). 
 126. The list of approved loans includes “a loan from any Federal, State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof, or is guaranteed by any Federal, State, or local government.” I.R.C. 
§ 465(b)(6)(B)(ii). In addition, loans obtained from a “qualified person” are acceptable. A qualified 
person is “any person which is actively and regularly engaged in the business of lending money and 
which is not (I) a related person with respect to the taxpayer, (II) a person from which the taxpayer 
acquired the property (or a related person to such person), or (III) a person who receives a fee with 
respect to the taxpayer’s investment in the property (or a related person to such person).” 
I.R.C.§ 49(a)(1)(D)(iv); I.R.C. § 465(b)(6)(D)(i). The last two exceptions help prevent structured, 
tax shelter-like transactions in which, for example, a promoter would package the deal and provide 
the nonrecourse financing. The related person restriction is suspended “if the financing from the 
related person is commercially reasonable and on substantially the same terms as loan involving 
unrelated persons.” I.R.C. § 465(b)(6)(D)(ii). “Related persons” is defined with reference to Code 
sections 267(b) and 707(b)(1), which include, for example, parents, grandparents, siblings, spouse, 
children, and grandchildren as well as certain entities. 
 127. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, Vol. 2, at 135–36 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4223–24 (explaining that “arms’ length terms” better limit “the opportunities 
for overvaluation of property and for the transfer of tax benefits attributable to amounts that resem-
ble equity”); S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 748 (1986) (“In the case of commercial financing . . . the lender 
is much less likely to make loans which exceed the property’s value or which cannot be serviced by 
the property; it is more likely that such financing will be repaid and that the purchaser consequently 
has or will have real equity in the activity.”), reprinted in 4 TAX REFORM 1986: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 748 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Margaret H. McDer-
mott eds., 1987); see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play 
in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) (exploring how third-party oversight, such as 
information reporting, improves compliance). 
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more likely to be repaid128 (or perhaps, more cynically, the real estate 
lobby was stronger than other groups129). 
Numerous other rules operate to ensure that taxpayers are not able 
to circumvent the classification system. For example, the statute provides 
that “a taxpayer shall not be considered at risk with respect to amounts 
protected against loss through nonrecourse financing, guarantees, stop 
loss agreements, or other similar arrangements.”130 This rule is likely 
difficult to police but is in line with the overall goal of the at-risk rules—
to limit the ability of taxpayers to get immediate tax benefits funded 
through debt that taxpayers are less likely to repay.131 The at-risk rules do 
not, however, depart from long-accepted conventions of permitting bor-
rowed basis. Indeed, the at-risk rules do not affect basis at all. Instead, 
the at-risk rules operate to slow down taxpayers’ access to deductions 
that are funded by nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt.132 
The at-risk rules are, however, generally perceived to be problemat-
ic on their own terms and redundant given the operation of other an-
ti-avoidance rules.133 A separate set of anti-avoidance rules—known as 
the passive activity loss rules—often have greater impact than the at-risk 
rules in targeting tax shelters designed to generate large quantities of pa-
                                                            
 128. See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 748 (1986) (emphasis added) (noting the need to extend the at-
risk rules to real estate because of the “opportunity for overvaluation” but also stating that such 
overvaluation is less likely “[i]n the case of commercial financing secured solely by the real proper-
ty”), reprinted in 4 TAX REFORM 1986: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 
at 748 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Margaret H. McDermott eds., 1987). 
 129. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 120, at 140 (reporting comment by member of 
Congress on 1986 act: “I was just outgunned by a real estate lobby that knows no limit to its 
greed.”); Kahng, supra note 9, at 209–12 (discussing real estate lobby in context of tax benefits for 
housing). 
 130. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4). A related rule specifies that a taxpayer may not count amounts “bor-
rowed from any person who has an interest” in the activity or “from a related person to a person 
(other than the taxpayer) having such an interest.” I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(A). These rules do not, howev-
er, apply if the “interest” the other person has is only that of being a creditor. In addition, corpora-
tions may borrow from their shareholders without this limitation applying. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(B). 
These rules prevent shifting of at-risk amounts and also prevent a taxpayer from claiming the at-risk 
amount when someone else in the same activity has a higher risk of loss as to the same dollars (alt-
hough the lender in this situation would not be able to increase her at-risk amount in the activity 
through lending the money). 
 131. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 747 (1986) (“The [at-risk rules are] designed to prevent a taxpayer 
from deducting losses in excess of the taxpayer’s actual economic investment in an activity. . . . [A] 
taxpayer’s deductible losses . . . are limited to the amount the taxpayer has placed at risk (i.e., the 
amount the taxpayer could actually lose) . . . .”), reprinted in 4 TAX REFORM 1986: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 747 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Margaret H. McDer-
mott eds., 1987). 
 132. Similar rules apply to restrict access to certain tax credits. I.R.C. § 49. 
 133. They were also criticized as failing to improve on the pre-enactment treatment of debt. 
See Coven, supra note 15, at 79. 
2015] Of More Than Usual Interest 59 
per deductions (e.g., depreciation) for taxpayers with little economic ex-
posure (e.g., limited partners).134 In addition, because the at-risk rules 
were enacted, judicial substance-over-form doctrines have become better 
developed and the economic substance doctrine has been codified.135 Be-
cause the at-risk rules only impact deductions financed by nonqualifying, 
nonrecourse debt and because various other anti-avoidance rules and 
standards are in place, the at-risk rules are unlikely to be a significant aid 
to efficient, fair tax administration. 
While it is debatable whether the at-risk rules are doing much 
heavy lifting, their timing mechanism for delaying deductions and their 
system for categorizing debt are reflected in other areas of the tax law. 
The timing mechanism of the at-risk rules appears to have been bor-
rowed from the treatment of shareholder basis in S corporations.136 And 
the use of likelihood of repayment to set tax consequences is heavily uti-
lized in tax partnerships to allocate debt basis among the tax partners.137 
                                                            
 134. I.R.C. § 469. 
 These rules categorize taxpayer activities as passive or nonpassive, with the key determination 
made by reference to the quantity and quality of time the taxpayer devotes to the activity—that is, 
whether a taxpayer “materially participates” in the activity. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1), (h); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.469-5T (as amended in 1996). Deductions and losses that are generated by passive activities are 
only deductible to the extent of a taxpayer’s income and gains from passive activities. I.R.C. 
§ 469(a)(2). Certain types of income streams (e.g., wages, dividends, and similar) are classified as 
nonpassive, with the result that the taxpayer’s deductions from passive activities is essentially lim-
ited by the amount of operating income from the taxpayer’s passive activities. I.R.C. § 469(e). Thus, 
the passive-activity-loss rules, like the at-risk rules, slow down a taxpayer’s access to deductions. 
Unlike the at-risk rules, where the loss limitation operates on the activity level, the passive-activity 
rules apply the limitation by aggregating all passive activities. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1). 
 Also unlike the at-risk rules, the passive-activity-loss rules are more likely to apply to certain 
rental real estate transactions. I.R.C. § 469(c)(2) (any rental activity is presumed passive). But see 
I.R.C. § 469(c)(7) (providing exception from presumption for taxpayers who spend substantial time 
in a real estate property business); I.R.C. § 469(i) (limited deduction for up to $25,000 of rental real 
estate deductions but with a phaseout beginning at $100,000 of adjusted gross income). The odd 
combination of exceptions for certain qualifying real estate debt in the at-risk rules and the broader 
inclusion for real estate in the passive-activity-loss rules may be explainable by the history of the 
reforms attempted through the 1986 Act. Chroniclers of the 1986 reform efforts note a strong real 
estate lobby was able to preserve real estate tax breaks in an earlier phase of the proposals. 
BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 120, at 140. Later in the process, when there was a need to find 
an offset for a lower rate, the passive activity loss rules were added to the main tax provisions. Id. at 
218-19 (noting that “[t]he screams from real estate interests to a similar proposal in the House” 
caused the proposals to be shelved but that the proposal later “seemed the perfect political solution to 
the puzzle that the 25-percent [rate] plan created”). 
 135. See Luke, supra note 103 (article discussing codification history of the economic sub-
stance doctrine). 
 136. See EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT, supra note 105 (noting that basis limits the 
deductions for both S corporation shareholders and partners but that S corporation shareholders are 
unable to increase basis for corporate debt). 
 137. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (as amended in 2005). 
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Thus, before turning to this Article’s main proposal, this Part briefly 
sketches out the rules for Subchapter S corporate debt and for tax part-
nership debt. 
Subchapter S corporations are generally not themselves subject to 
taxation;138 instead, the shareholders of the S corporation are allocated a 
pro rata portion of the S corporation’s income, expenses, and similar 
items.139 For example, a taxpayer owning 10% of an S corporation would 
have to pay tax on 10% of the S corporation’s income. In order to be an 
S corporation, an entity must not have more than one class of stock.140 As 
a result, determining an S corporation shareholder’s pro rata portion of 
the tax items generated by the corporation is relatively straightforward. If 
the S corporation generates net losses rather than net income, these ex-
pense and loss items are similarly allocated pro rata among the share-
holders.141 
The S corporation may, of course, borrow money. Even though the 
S corporation does not itself pay taxes, the S corporation must calculate 
the entity’s income and deduction items before these are allocated to its 
shareholders.142 The S corporation will, for example, have tax basis in its 
assets and will use that tax basis to calculate depreciation on those as-
sets;143 in turn, the depreciation deductions will be allocated to the share-
holders. Shareholders will, however, be able to utilize allocated deduc-
tions immediately only if they have either sufficient basis in their owner-
ship interest or sufficient “basis in indebtedness.”144 These limitations 
operate before the at-risk rules145 and act as an initial limitation on the 
ability of S corporation owners to use borrowed S corporation deduc-
tions.   
                                                            
 138. I.R.C. § 1363(a). 
 139. I.R.C. § 1366(a). In order to elect to be an S corporation, an entity must meet various 
requirements relating to the number of shareholders, the type of shareholders, and the rights of 
shareholders. I.R.C. § 1361. 
 140. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). An exception exists relating to differences in voting rights. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(1) (as amended in 2008) (“Differences in voting rights among shares of stock of a 
corporation are disregarded in determining whether a corporation has more than one class of stock. 
Thus, if all shares of stock of an S corporation have identical rights to distribution and liquidation 
proceeds, the corporation may have [voting differences].”). 
 141. I.R.C. § 1366(a). 
 142. I.R.C. § 1363(b) (requiring that the taxable income of an S corporation “be computed in 
the same manner as in the case of an individual” with certain exceptions, several of them relating to 
personal deductions that are irrelevant to business entities). 
 143. See I.R.C. § 168 (computation of depreciation on tangible assets); I.R.C. § 197 (computa-
tion of amortization on certain intangible assets). 
 144. I.R.C. § 1366(d). 
 145 . And the at-risk rules operate before the passive activity loss rules. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.469-2T(d)(6) (as amended in 1993). 
2015] Of More Than Usual Interest 61 
S corporation shareholders increase basis in their shares by making 
contributions to the S corporation and upon receiving pro rata allocations 
of income items.146 Critically, even though the S corporation will incor-
porate borrowed basis into its calculations of depreciation and other de-
ductions, the borrowed basis is not accessible to the shareholders.147 As a 
result, shareholders do not have access to basis borrowed by the S corpo-
ration even though the shareholder will be allocated deductions funded in 
part by that borrowed basis. 148 The shareholder will have to wait to use 
the deductions until the shareholder has personal basis in his or her inter-
est. It is this delay in gaining access to borrowed deductions that is simi-
lar to the at-risk amount computing rules found in the at-risk rules. Of 
course, a large difference is that the at-risk rules only apply the delay to 
deductions deemed funded by nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt. 
For example, consider an S corporation with two fifty-percent own-
ers, Shareholders E and F, who currently each have a basis of $1,000 in 
the S corporation. Assume the S corporation borrows $100,000 to pur-
chase Asset Y, which gives rise to an immediate $100,000 deduction ow-
ing to a special tax incentive tied to this asset. The S corporation itself 
does not utilize the deduction because it is not a taxpayer; instead it will 
allocate the deduction equally between Shareholders E and F. Sharehold-
ers E and F will, however, only be able to take a $1,000 deduction each 
and will also have to reduce stock basis to $0; each would have $49,000 
of suspended deduction. The $100,000 basis attributable to the bank debt 
is not available to the shareholders to increase stock basis, and therefore 
is not available to increase the amount available to support deductions. If 
the shareholders want to gain access to their suspended deductions, they 
would have to make further contributions to the S corporations or be al-
located additional income from the S corporation.149   
                                                            
 146. I.R.C. § 358 (basis in shares received in qualifying exchange with corporation); I.R.C. 
§ 1367(a)(1). 
 147. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2) (as amended in 2014). 
 148. The at-risk rules apply to the shareholder’s ownership interest; thus, if the shareholder 
uses nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt to purchase the interest, the shareholder’s at-risk amount in the 
activity will be $0. 
 149. Shareholders are not able to transfer these suspended losses on transfer of the interest, 
with the only exception being qualifying transfers to spouses or ex-spouses. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2). 
The original “small business corporation” election rules, enacted in 1958, contained rules for adjust-
ing shareholder basis. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 
1650. This first attempt required shareholders to increase basis for gross income shares, “but only to 
the extent to which such amount is included in his gross income in his return,” and to decrease basis 
(but not below zero and without a carried forward suspended loss) by the shareholder’s portion of 
the entity’s net operating loss. Id. at 1655. Provision was made for basis in indebtedness and appears 
to be the same basic requirement as is in place today: “The basis of any indebtedness of an electing 
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S corporation shareholders may only get access to entity-level debt 
basis by being the lender on such debt.150 This is the concept of “basis in 
indebtedness.”151 Returning to the previous example, if the S corporation 
had borrowed the $100,000 from Shareholder E instead of from a bank, 
Shareholder E would still have had only $1,000 of basis in his stock, but 
he would also have had $100,000 of basis in indebtedness. As a result, 
Shareholder E would not run into a limitation caused by lack of basis 
until more than $101,000 of deductions was allocated to him.152 All cred-
itors take a basis in the loans they make equal to the principal amount 
                                                                                                                                     
small business corporation to a shareholder of such corporation” was reduced, again not below zero, 
and only after basis in stock had been reduced. Id. 
 Because of technical flaws (for example, the lack of a carryforward for suspended losses), the 
first set of rules was eventually repealed and replaced in 1982 by rules that are substantially similar 
to those in place today. See Samuel P. Starr et al., S Corporations: Formation and Termination, 730-
3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income, § I (2015). The 1982 legislation used the same phrase for basis 
in indebtedness used in the current Internal Revenue Code. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1678 (“[T]he shareholder’s adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S 
corporation to the shareholder . . . .”). 
 The limitation on S corporation shareholders’ access to entity-level borrowed basis appears not 
to have its origin in concerns about timing but instead seems the accidental byproduct of the original 
goal of Subchapter S, which was to provide pass-through treatment for shareholders in certain small 
corporations. See President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Budget Message to the 83d Congress (1954) 
(“Small businesses should be able to operate under whatever form of organization is desirable for 
their particular circumstances . . . I recommend that corporations with a small number of active 
stockholders be given the option to be taxed as partnerships . . . .”); Starr et al., supra, § 1.A. For a 
general discussion of the evolution of Subchapter S, see Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small 
Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the History of Organization Choice in the 1950s, 6 
PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2008). As discussed infra Part III.C, corporate level debt is not accessible to 
shareholders. 
 150. The debt must be “bona fide.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 2014). The 
regulations also now expressly provide that a loan guarantee is insufficient; payment on the guaran-
tee must actually be made before a shareholder can increase basis in indebtedness. Id. § 1.1366-
2(a)(2)(ii).  Even before the regulations, most courts to consider the issue determined that a guaran-
tee of the S corporation’s debt was not sufficient to increase basis. The one outlier decision, Selfe v. 
United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985), was repeatedly criticized and limited to its facts by the 
Eleventh Circuit. See Estate of Leavitt v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 206, 216–17 (1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 420, 
421 n.8 (4th Cir. 1989); Maloof v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d, 645, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2006); Sleiman v. 
Comm’r, 187 F.3d 1352, 1356–59 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Basis of Indebtedness of S Corporations 
to Their Shareholders, 79 Fed. Reg. 42675 (2014) (preamble to 2014 regulations adopting require-
ment of performance on guarantee in order to obtain basis in indebtedness). 
 151. I.R.C. § 1366(d). 
 152. The pro rata allocation rules will, however, prevent the shareholders from allocating a 
larger portion to Shareholder E. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1). In other words, the $80,000 loan will not in-
crease Shareholder E’s ownership stake or his pro rata share of allocated items. He could still only 
be allocated $50,000 of the deduction attributable to the purchase of Asset Y. 
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loaned; the S corporation rule allows the lender-shareholder to use that 
basis to offset S corporation allocations.153 
The partnership tax system is drastically different from the S corpo-
ration system when it comes to borrowed deductions.154 Tax partners are 
able to allocate partnership tax items by agreement rather than by pro 
rata share, though this ability is subject to a host of anti-abuse rules.155 
Tax partners are also assigned a portion of the partnership’s debt basis to 
support the use of allocated deductions.156 Indeed, in direct contrast to 
the rules governing S corporation debt, if an obligation is treated as a 
partnership liability, then the basis attached to that liability must be as-
signed among the partners.157 Borrowed basis is assigned to the partner 
who bears the economic risk of loss of the debt, as determined through 
running a hypothetical scenario in which it is assumed that the partner-
ship fails to pay its debts, which have all been accelerated, because all 
the partnership’s assets are valueless (including cash).158 If, after running 
the scenario, no partner bears the economic risk of loss, the liability is 
termed partnership nonrecourse debt and the borrowed basis must be as-
                                                            
 153. The lender-shareholder will not, however, benefit twice; if the loan is repaid at a time 
when the lender-shareholder has a basis lower than the repayment amount on account of prior alloca-
tions, the shareholder will have a gain. Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 C.B. 304. 
 154. The difference between partnership debt and S corporation debt has received attention 
from various tax writers, with some arguing that the S corporation rules should be expanded to allow 
access to basis. See, e.g., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES 206–14 (American Law Institute 1999); James S. Eustice, Subchapter S Corporations 
and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals), 39 TAX 
L. REV. 345, 397–400 (1984); Martin D. Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax 
World, 47 TAX L. REV. 665, 669–70 n.35 (1992); Roberta Mann, Subchapter S: Vive le Difference!, 
18 CHAP. L. REV. 65 (2014); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S – Just Do It, 
62 TAX LAW 749 (2009). 
 For a brief period of time, partners were not permitted to enjoy basis increases for “any part-
nership liability with respect to which the partner has no personal liability.” Tax Reform Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213, 90 Stat. 1520, 1548. This was put in place at the same time as the 
initial round of at-risk rules. See discussion of enactment history supra note 107. When the at-risk 
rules were expanded in 1978 to cover all non-real estate activities, this partnership-specific provision 
was dropped. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 § 201, 92 Stat. 2763, 2814–15. 
 155. See I.R.C. § 704. 
 156. I.R.C. § 752. 
 157. I.R.C. § 752. 
 158. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (as amended in 2006). Some property secured directly by nonre-
course debt will be treated as having value. Although partnership-level debt is reflected in a partner’s 
basis in her partnership interest, partnership-level debt assigned under Code section 752 does not 
increase a partner’s book value account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)–(c) (as amended in 
2015). This makes logical sense as the partners’ capital account book values are proxies for partner 
equity stakes. Because debt does not increase partner wealth, it does not increase these accounts. 
Allocation of tax items to partners with negative capital account book values will still be respected 
under certain conditions. The regulations laying out those conditions are some of the most complex 
in all of the tax system. Id. § 1.704-1. 
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signed using a different rubric—one that generally assigns the basis ac-
cording to partner profit share.159 
Deductions attributable to borrowed basis are generally also allo-
cated by agreement, although partnership nonrecourse deductions are 
subject to limitations that increase the likelihood that the partner benefit-
ing from the deduction will also be the partner having to pay the tax on 
any gain arising on disposition of the property securing the debt.160 De-
tailing the nuances and complexities of partnership distributive share al-
locations is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the 
rules not only permit partners to gain access to borrowed deductions but 
also permit partnership earnings that could be viewed as paying for such 
borrowed deductions to be allocated differently from the original as-
signment of borrowed basis.161 In other words, the timing benefit availa-
ble for borrowed deductions may be expanded through strategic agree-
ment on allocations. 
The at-risk rules do, of course, apply to individual partners, but they 
do not apply at the partnership level. Partnership debt that is 
nonqualifying, nonrecourse debt and is assigned to a partner decreases 
that partner’s at-risk amount in the partnership activity.162 Courts inter-
preting the at-risk rules do not necessarily accept the determination of 
recourse or nonrecourse under the partnership tax rules.163 For example, 
the Tax Court has held that a partner’s obligation to restore a deficit in 
his capital account did not make the partner’s debt share recourse for 
purposes of the at-risk rules, even if it was sufficient for purposes of the 
partnership tax rules.164 Even so, it seems likely that the partnership defi-
nition of recourse debt influences how the at-risk rules work in practice 
and, as a result, may further diminish the role of the at-risk rules. As dis-
cussed above, the partnership tax rules make use of a highly stylized, 
                                                            
 159. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (as amended in 2000). 
 160. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (as amended in 2011). 
 161. The minimum gain chargeback rules do mitigate this for nonrecourse deductions. Id.; see 
also Coven, supra note 15, at 60–62. 
 162. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2), (6); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 32242 (June 5, 
1979). 
 163. For qualified, nonrecourse debt, however, the statute provides a special rule requiring that 
the partner’s share of the qualifying debt will be determined using the partnership rules. I.R.C. 
§ 465(b)(6)(C). 
 164. Hubert Enterprises, Inc., v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194 (2008) (decision on remand). 
The Hubert case triggered a wave of commentary regard in the interactions between the at-risk rules 
and the partnership debt assignment rules. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 68; Ajay Gupta, Who’s at 
Risk? Abbott and Costello Take on Section 465, Part 1, 120 TAX NOTES 335 (2008); Richard M. 
Lipton, At-Risk Rules and DROs: Did the Tax Court Err in Hubert Enterprises? 103 J. TAX’N 325 
(2005); Richard M. Lipton & Todd D. Golub, Hubert Enterprises Part II: We Can ‘Guarantee’ a 
Better Result, 109 J. TAX’N 14 (2008). 
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unrealistic hypothetical liquidation and ask whether in such a situation 
any partner would be required to contribute money for debt repayment.165 
Recently, the Treasury has issued proposed regulations that would make 
these rules more meaningful by requiring partnerships to examine more 
closely actual financial capacity of the partners. 166  These regulations 
have been met by practitioners with dismay and sharp criticism.167 It 
seems probable that the proposed regulations will be revised.168 
To summarize, the at-risk rules are a chimera, consisting of an 
analysis tied to the nature of the debt and a timing delay system only ap-
plicable in the presence of a single type of debt. S corporation debt basis 
is subject principally to a timing delay system.169 Tax partnership debt 
basis is required to be assigned to partners using, again, a system tied to 
the nature of the debt.170 As discussed in Part I, the two main concerns 
associated with debt principal are (1) the possibility of sham or 
near-sham debt, and (2) the ability to gain timing benefits through the 
use of borrowed basis. The temptation to engage in the first is largely 
driven by the attempt to super-size the timing benefits.171 Yet, the at-risk 
rules and the partnership tax rules use a rough approximation of the na-
ture of a particular debt before tackling the issue of timing (at-risk rules) 
or borrowed deduction gamesmanship (partnership tax). Using debt sta-
tus does alleviate avoidant uses of borrowed basis, but the current model 
is unnuanced and, as the debate over the proposed partnership debt regu-
lations illustrates, it would be difficult to administer and enforce a system 
                                                            
 165. See supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. 
 166. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2, 79 Fed. Reg. 4826-01 (Jan. 30, 2014). Proposals were also 
made regarding other aspects of the partnership liability rules, including overlapping obligations and 
related partners. Section 752 and Related Party Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 76092 (proposed Dec. 16, 2013); 
see also Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199, 211–17 (2010) (taxpayers used indemnities and 
guarantees to attempt to manipulate the assignment of economic risk of loss, and thereby basis, of 
LLC debt). 
 167. See Blake D. Rubin et al., A “Guaranteed” Debacle: Proposed Partnership Liability 
Regulations, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 73-6 (Apr. 16, 2014); New York State Bar Association, 
NYSBA Members Address Regs on Allocating Partnership Liabilities, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 
221-60 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
 168. See Matthew R. Madara, Partnership Debt Allocation Changes May Reflect NYSBA 
Comments, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 234-3 (Dec. 4, 2014) (calling the proposed regulations “much 
maligned”); David van den Berg, Official Says Treasury May Split Up Partnership Regs, 2014 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 203-4 (Oct. 20, 2014) (Treasury may use “faster track” for less controversial, dis-
guised sale portion than the debt-related proposals). 
 169. Again, this does not appear originally to have been by design. See supra note 150. 
 170. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (as amended in 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (as amended in 2006); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (as amended in 2000). 
 171. In partnership tax, there is, of course, also a strong temptation to shift the debt-financed 
deductions to those who can make the most use of them. 
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that used a finer gradient for distinguishing debt.172 An alternative, and 
the one highlighted in this Article, is to implement a more precise treat-
ment of basis borrowing in the first instance.173 The subsequent Parts 
discuss possible methods for doing so. 
III. RATIONING BORROWED BASIS 
This Part explores solving the timing distortion through use of a de-
layed benefit rule, similar to that used already by S corporations and as a 
component of the at-risk rules. As touched on above, a system for ration-
ing access to borrowed basis requires a separate tracking mechanism, 
here termed “nonborrowed basis.” In such a system, the amount of 
nonborrowed basis would be calculated by increasing it for taxable in-
come and for certain tax-exempt items (e.g., tax-exempt interest on qual-
ifying municipal bonds), then reducing it by borrowed basis. Deductions 
would only be permitted to the extent of this nonborrowed basis, with 
deductions then also reducing the available nonborrowed basis amounts. 
Decreases to nonborrowed basis would also need to be reduced for pay-
ments that are nondeductible for various reasons but that represent true 
economic outlays (e.g., distributions to owners, nondeductible bribes).174 
A simple system can be illustrated by returning to an example from 
Part I. In that part, Investor B used $100,000 borrowed dollars to pur-
chase Asset Y, which, in the absence of a restriction on the use of bor-
rowed basis, generated an immediate $100,000 deduction. Under a ra-
tioning system, the $100,000 deduction would still be calculated at the 
time Asset Y is purchased, but Investor B would not get to use the tax 
deduction on her tax return until she had obtained offsetting 
nonborrowed basis. In the example, that would not happen until she sold 
the asset to repay the debt at the end of Year 5. The $100,000 taxed gain 
would generate nonborrowed basis that would allow Investor B finally to 
use the $100,000 deduction held in suspension since the original pur-
chase. The overall economics of the rationing system are the same as 
under current law in absolute value terms – in both cases a $100,000 de-
duction and a $100,000 gain cancel each other out, assuming equal tax 
                                                            
 172. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
 173. In the tax partnership area, the temptation to shift deductions to others would remain, 
though resolving the timing benefit should also act as a significant restraint on that problem. 
 174. This system has obvious parallels to how shareholder basis operates in subchapter S and 
to the calculation of the “at risk” amount. See supra Part II. For a proposed deferral system that is 
more closely tied to repayment and purchase money debt, see McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1104–
30. 
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rates at both times—but with a rationing system, the timing advantage 
has been removed.175 
The example, however, suggests further questions; for instance, to 
what extent should Investor B’s taxable income from other sources be 
treated as increasing nonborrowed basis and to what extent should Inves-
tor B’s other debt reduce nonborrowed basis? The examples in this Arti-
cle have generally assumed a single asset and a direct and obvious rela-
tionship between the source of the nonborrowed basis and the use of the 
debt principal. That is, offsetting, earned basis was all sourced from the 
investment purchased with the borrowed money (or the debt was unpaid, 
so nonborrowed basis was funded through the operation of the cancella-
tion of indebtedness rules). But of course, taxpayers may have numerous 
other investments and business activities generating deductions and 
funded, in whole or in part, through numerous other debts. 
At one extreme, a rationing system could be implemented at the in-
dividual asset level, with the taxpayer required to utilize multiple asset 
baskets. As to each asset basket, deductions would be allowed out only to 
the extent that nonborrowed basis had accrued in excess of borrowed 
basis. The use of multiple baskets is fairly common in the tax system, 
including, as discussed in the previous part, in the current at-risk rules.176 
But attempting to impose a basketing regime at such a granular level 
would raise obvious administrative problems. At the other extreme, the 
rationing system could apply at the taxpayer level. All nonborrowed dol-
lars (without regard to whether there is any likelihood that they will be 
used to repay the debt or whether there is any relationship to the bor-
rowed deductions) could be treated as valid substitutes, so long as the 
nonborrowed basis in the aggregate exceeds the borrowed basis in the 
aggregate. 
If a rationing system is used, an aggregate measurement appears to 
be the best choice because money is fungible and it may be difficult to 
assign debt to a particular asset.177 Two key difficulties, however, are 
present. First, a simple aggregate measurement, in the case of individual 
taxpayers, would need to account for personal consumption and personal 
debt. Second, an economically rational debtor would never repay certain 
                                                            
 175. A rate differential may still exist depending on the terms of the deduction and how the 
basis is earned. For example, the deduction might be an ordinary deduction, while the earned basis 
might be long-term capital gain eligible for a preferential tax rate. 
 176. The at-risk rules apply at an activity level; an activity may consist of a single asset or may 
consist of multiple assets supporting the activity. I.R.C. § 465 (2012). See supra notes 117–135 and 
accompanying text; see also Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, A Tasket: Basketing and Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557 (2011) (discussing concept of basketing and providing examples). 
 177. See infra Part IV.A for a more extended discussion of these points. 
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types of debt (raising the specter of needing to categorize debt). The next 
two subsections explore these issues, while a third subsection discusses 
the problem of applying a rationing rule to all corporations. Alternative 
approaches to a rationing system will be briefly taken up in Part IV. 
A. Personal Consumption and Personal Debt  
The issues raised by personal consumption are explored through 
examples. Consider Investor B who spends $100,000 on Asset Y, a cost 
that is immediately deductible. Assume that during the same year, Inves-
tor B also has $100,000 of wage income and spends $100,000 on nonde-
ductible personal living costs (e.g., rent, vacation, clothing, food, etc.). 
Instead of borrowing money to purchase Asset Y, Investor B could use 
his wages to buy Asset Y and fund his personal living expenses with 
$100,000 of debt. In spite of the formal change, Investor B could, how-
ever, still be viewed as paying for Asset Y with borrowed basis because 
of the fungibility of cash. A system for rationing the use of borrowed 
basis would need to construct rules for handling consumer debt and non-
deductible consumer costs. 
One possible approach would be to cast the net as widely as possi-
ble so that nonborrowed basis is increased for all taxable income, includ-
ing wages, and then decreased for all debt, including consumer debt. The 
excess of nonborrowed basis over borrowed basis would then have to be 
apportioned between nondeductible and deductible costs, including con-
sumer expenses.178 To illustrate, consider again Investor B and assume 
that this time she has $200,000 of wage income and $100,000 of credit 
card debt. This would leave $100,000 of nonborrowed basis. If Investor 
B both purchases Asset Y for $100,000 and has $100,000 of nondeducti-
ble consumer costs, a broadly set, pro rata system would require Investor 
B to allocate the nonborrowed basis between the two types of outlays; as 
a result, $50,000 of the cost of Asset Y would be deductible and the 
nonborrowed basis would be reduced to $0. Alternatively, a prioritization 
rule could be selected; for example, consumer costs could reduce 
nonborrowed basis before business or investment costs (or vice versa). 
To illustrate such a prioritization variation, in the preceding the example, 
the nonborrowed basis of $100,000 could instead be reduced to $0 by all 
$100,000 of the nondeductible consumer costs, thereby requiring Inves-
                                                            
 178. Most consumer expenses are not deductible, with some exceptions provided expressly by 
Congress. I.R.C. § 262. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (home mortgage interest); I.R.C. § 165(c)(3); 
I.R.C. § 170 (charitable contributions). 
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tor B to wait to use the deduction for Asset Y until she accrued new 
nonborrowed basis. 
While casting the net widely would be more accurate, as the exam-
ples above suggest, such an approach would give rise to a whole host of 
administrative problems, not to mention create ugly optics and political 
fallout. Thus, a rationing system would have to devise a more palatable 
approach to consumer debt and expenses. The obvious alternative would 
be to ignore some combination of consumer earnings, costs, and debt. 
The at-risk rules suggest a possible avenue, which is to increase 
nonborrowed basis only for contributions to investments or businesses 
and for returns on investments and businesses. As a result, wages would 
only increase nonborrowed basis if those wages are invested.179 So long 
as consumer debt does not exceed consumer costs, a rationing system 
could also simply ignore both consumer debt and consumer costs as a 
matter of administrative convenience. 180  The difficulty is that formal 
consumer debt could exceed consumer costs, thereby facilitating a larger 
nonborrowed basis than would be appropriate. Introducing exceptions to 
a rationing system would broaden the possibilities for avoidance. The 
risk may be fairly low, given that there are some natural, nontax limits on 
the amount and types of consumer debt.181 Substance-over-form judicial 
solutions would, of course, also be available. 
Should Congress ever seriously consider a rationing system, legis-
lation could set limits as to consumer debt. Consumer debt up to certain 
limits could be ignored; for example, home equity debt up to a particular 
amount,182 all home acquisition debt,183 all student loans, all automobile 
                                                            
 179. Line-drawing rules would be required here; for example, whether and when amounts 
deposited in a simple checking or savings account should be treated as invested. See David A. 
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 
(1999). One possibility is to treat cash and cash equivalents as noninvestments. The tax system al-
ready makes use of the concept of cash equivalents in other contexts. See BURKE & FRIEL, supra 
note 37, at 651–53 (discussing cash equivalents with respect to cash method of accounting). 
 180. This would provide a prioritization rule that would cause the nonborrowed basis amount 
to be available first for business and investment costs. 
 181. The need for consumer protection against predatory lending practices, however, points to 
failures in the consumer credit market. See Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lend-
er”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 
(2012) (discussing background of usurious lending and discussing market failure in high-cost, “pay-
day” type loans). Sham consumer debt used to inflate personal, itemized or above-the-line deduc-
tions is unlikely to be a problem because of the limitations inherent in taking personal deductions. 
 182. For example, double the $100,000 limitation on home equity debt already in place for 
purposes of determining the deductibility of home equity debt interest. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C). 
 183. If the same definition for acquisition debt already found in the Code is used, home acqui-
sition debt would automatically be offset by consumer cost outlay. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B) (defining 
“acquisition indebtedness”). 
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acquisition debt, and all other consumer debt up to some set amount.184 
Such limits would still allow taxpayers some limited ability to use bor-
rowed basis for business and investment deductions (and could also cre-
ate new opportunities for avoidance), but the tradeoff would likely be 
worthwhile in light of the potential administrative costs of policing a 
more accurate system. 
B. Nonrecourse Debt Considerations 
This Article has argued that, when it comes to debt principal, the 
tax system should focus first on timing rather than on likelihood of re-
payment. This section explores whether a system emphasizing timing 
may still need to take into account the likelihood of repayment in design-
ing its rules. The pervasiveness of the recourse/nonrecourse dichotomy 
counsels cautious analysis rather than casual dismissal.185 The first sub-
section below addresses the case of individuals (whether held directly by 
the individuals or through a disregarded entity) holding assets secured by 
nonrecourse debt. The second subsection considers the particular case of 
tax partnerships. 
1. Nonrecourse Debt Directly Owed by Individuals  
In the course of rendering its decision in Crane, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the tax system’s treatment of debt might be different in the 
event the amount of a nonrecourse debt came to exceed the value of the 
property securing it because of declining property values; an economical-
ly rational taxpayer would not pay such a debt.186 Later, in Tufts, the Su-
preme Court determined that this fact did not require a different result, 
and in the process also reaffirmed the current tax system’s approach to 
borrowed basis.187 This subsection asks whether the recourse or nonre-
course nature of a debt should change the operation of the rationing sys-
                                                            
 184. This Article does not propose resetting the boundaries of human capital vs. investment—
thus, home mortgages and student loans are treated as consumer debts. See generally Louis Kaplow, 
Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994). 
 185. See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text. 
 186. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947); see Cain, supra note 89, at 2–7 (discussing 
footnote 37 of Crane). 
 187. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311–13 (1983). Crane and Tufts have been the subject of 
numerous articles. See William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983); Cain, supra 
note 89; Richard Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 100 (1972); Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1 FLA. 
TAX REV. 115 (1992); Martin D. Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975); Calvin H. 
Johnson, Play Money Basis: When Is Nonrecourse Liability a Valid Cost?, 11 VA. TAX. REV. 631 
(1992), Linda Sugin, Nonrecourse Debt Revisited, Restructured and Redefined, 51 TAX L. REV. 115 
(1994); see also Yin, supra note 15. 
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tem suggested in this Part, and it concludes that for individual investors 
and sole proprietors, the nature of the debt should not change the opera-
tion of a broad-based rationing system.188 
The reason is that the tax system already has a set of rules (albeit 
perhaps also in need of reform) to deal with debtors who do not pay their 
debts. As discussed in Part I, if a debtor fails to make actual payments, 
eventually the tax system will require an accounting.189 So long as all 
nonconsumer debt reduces nonborrowed basis and all business and in-
vestment outlays also reduce such nonborrowed basis, the proposed sys-
tem could forego additional exceptions or rules tied to the recourse or 
nonrecourse rules as to individuals. 
This can be illustrated through yet again considering the ubiquitous 
Asset Y. In Part I, Investor C purchased Asset Y but refused to repay the 
debt used to finance its purchase even though Investor C had the re-
sources to do so. As discussed in Part I, Investor C, in the absence of a 
system delaying borrowed basis, had been able to exploit the time it 
would take for the tax system to remedy this (whether through gain at 
foreclosure or debt reduction triggering cancellation of indebtedness in-
come) to wring further tax timing benefits from the original deduction 
for the purchase of Asset Y. 
First, consider what would occur if Asset Y retains its value and 
was purchased with nonrecourse debt. Assume that Asset Y is Investor 
C’s only investment asset and the debt his only nonconsumer debt.190 
Investor C’s nonborrowed basis would be zero—$100,000 investment 
purchase minus the $100,000 nonrecourse debt. Investor C would thus 
not be permitted to use the deduction for the purchase until Investor C 
could increase nonborrowed basis. Whether Investor C sells Asset Y, 
loses Asset Y through foreclosure, or negotiates for a reduction in the 
debt, the deduction will be permitted only as Investor C increases his 
nonborrowed basis through recognizing income.191 
Of course, this example focuses only on a single asset; a related 
question is the advisability of a broad-based rationing system that would 
allow for aggregation across activities and investments when only some 
involve nonrecourse debt. To place this in the context of a particular fact 
                                                            
 188. As is also the case under current law, the need for provision against sham debt would 
remain. See supra notes 105–106, 113–115 and accompanying text; see also McMahon, Jr., supra 
note 15, at 1068 (observing that timing advantage applies to both recourse and nonrecourse debt). 
 189. See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text; Coven, supra note 15, at 67–69. 
 190. This example assumes a system such as that proposed supra Part III.A in which consumer 
debt and consumer costs are excepted. 
 191. Because the debt is nonrecourse, Investor C will not be able to sell Asset Y without also 
ending his obligation to repay the debt. See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983). 
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pattern, consider whether Investor C, who purchased Asset Y with non-
recourse debt, should gain access to the deduction for the cost of Asset Y 
if he buys Asset X with $100,000 of his earnings from his regular em-
ployment.192 In other words, the question is whether the purchase of a 
different investment should increase the nonborrowed basis amount 
when the property providing the deduction is secured by nonrecourse 
debt. 
Assume that Asset X’s purchase price is not immediately deducti-
ble but does yield yearly depreciation deductions of $20,000 for five 
years. Running through five years of ownership of both Asset Y and As-
set X suggests that even with an expansive aggregate view of 
nonborrowed basis and debt, the timing advantages would be ad-
dressed.193 In the first year, Investor C would get a $100,000 deduction, 
but his nonborrowed basis would be reduced to $0 and he would have a 
$20,000 suspended deduction. During Years 2–5, the suspended deduc-
tions would increase by $20,000 each year, until there was a total of 
$100,000 of suspended deduction. If Investor C chooses not to repay the 
nonrecourse debt, Investor C would not be able to gain access to those 
suspended deductions. Eventually, foreclosure would assure the needed 
increase,194 but Investor C’s initial decision to delay repayment does not 
work in his favor. 
As with any set of new tax rules, taxpayers would undoubtedly de-
vise novel avoidance tactics195 (or lobby Congress for various exceptions 
that would make such developments more possible). The aim of this Ar-
ticle is, however, to illustrate that at least in the absence of tax avoidance, 
such a system has the ability to address the timing mismatch between 
borrowing basis and earning an equivalent amount of basis. 
2. Pass-Through Entities with Limited Liability  
This subsection addresses the extent to which likelihood of repay-
ment would still matter in partnership taxation if a broad-based rationing 
                                                            
 192. This again assumes a system that ignores consumer debt and consumer costs. 
 193. As with the examples of Part I, it should be assumed that annual returns and interest offset 
each other and no other investment activities occur during the five years. 
 194. The full amount of the debt would be included in amount realized; Investor C would have 
a zero basis in the asset because of the depreciation deductions. Thus, sale would yield the $100,000 
of gain needed to increase nonborrowed basis to $100,000. The same result would occur if Investor 
C negotiated a reduction of debt through the increase to cancellation of indebtedness income. Ad-
dressing the gaps in the tax attribute reduction rules relating to bankruptcy, insolvency and other 
exclusions is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Luke, supra note 97 (article discussing taxpayer adaptation of wraparound annuity 
structure in response to new rules). 
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system were enacted. The problem is more complex than for individuals 
holding assets directly because of the basis shifting opportunities availa-
ble inside partnerships. 
Tax partnerships, including limited liability companies, may pro-
vide liability protection to their owners, with the result that the enti-
ty-level debt is effectively nonrecourse as to those owners. As discussed 
above, the partnership tax rules assign borrowed basis among the owners, 
with more stringent rules applicable if no partner has the economic risk 
of loss as to that debt.196 Because partners may be able to manipulate the 
economic risk of loss, tax partners not only have access to the timing 
benefits inherent in borrowed basis but also may attempt to shift the bor-
rowed basis to those who can most benefit from the associated deduc-
tions.197 S corporations provide similar limited liability to their share-
holders, but as discussed above, an S corporation’s borrowed basis is not 
directly available to the shareholders. Further, S corporations are unable 
to make special allocations to particular shareholders, which limits S 
corporation shareholders’ access to basis-shifting techniques.198 
One possibility would be to maintain the current partnership tax 
rules that assign basis to partners for partnership debt and impose addi-
tional scrutiny on deductions deemed traceable to nonrecourse debt.199 A 
rationing system could require that the amount of borrowing assigned to 
that partner under partnership tax rules would then become the amount 
that would be used to compute that partner’s nonborrowed basis amount. 
While this approach would seem to limit the need to amend the already 
complex partnership tax rules, it appears likely to open up other avenues 
for gamesmanship. For example, partners with ample nonborrowed basis 
from other sources could continue to use the relatively permissive eco-
nomic risk of loss rules to increase their share of partnership debt; a part-
ner with excess nonborrowed basis (or a partner indifferent to U.S. tax 
law) might be willing to increase his or her borrowing amounts in order 
to accommodate partners who wanted a temporary lowering of their bor-
rowed basis amounts. To be sure, substantiality requirements are already 
in place, but these are generally perceived as problematic200 and in any 
case would arguably need to be expanded to encompass allocations lack-
                                                            
 196. See supra notes 154–168 and accompanying text. 
 197. Recent regulation proposals aim to make this more difficult. See supra notes 166–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 198. See supra Part II. 
 199. See supra Part II. 
 200. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners’ Interests in a Partner-
ship, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1077 (2011); Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Alloca-
tions, 64 TAX LAW. 97 (2010). 
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ing substantiality on account of shifting, underlying borrowed basis as-
signments.201 
The most administratively straightforward solution would be to use 
the one already utilized for subchapter S debt: no partner-level basis for 
partnership debt.202 The partnership would continue to keep track of basis 
at the entity level, and partnership deductions would, of course, continue 
to be allocable by agreement.203 Removing the ability to use immediately 
deductions funded through borrowing would further lessen the ability to 
turn partnerships into markets for tax attributes. Partnership tax rules 
could likely be simplified (though always with an eye toward possible 
new avenues for tax avoidance); if partners are unable to bolster basis 
with partnership borrowed basis,204 the debt-basis-assignment rules could 
be eliminated and the need for rules regarding nonrecourse deductions 
would be reduced.205 Such a change would also have the benefit of mov-
ing Subchapter S and partnership taxation somewhat closer together, 
                                                            
 201. Perhaps this should happen even in the absence of broader debt reform, possibly as an 
alternative to attempts to police recourse debt more directly. See supra notes 166–168 and accompa-
nying text 
 202. Professor Calvin Johnson has made a proposal that would have a similar effect in certain 
situations but operates on the partner capital accounts rather than on partners’ basis in their interest. 
Calvin H. Johnson, Don’t Let Capital Accounts Go Negative, 129 TAX NOTES 127 (2010). The pres-
ence of negative capital accounts indicates that a partner has been assigned deduction allocations 
paid for with borrowing. 
 203. Subject to the limitations that already apply—e.g., that the allocations have substantial 
economic effect. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2012). 
 204. Just as for S corporation shareholders, partners who purchased their partnership interests 
with borrowed money would still have to adjust their nonborrowed amounts by that use. 
 205. The extremely complex partnership nonrecourse deduction allocation and minimum gain 
chargeback regulations relate to the economic effect requirement of Code section 704(b). Specifical-
ly if deductions are financed with nonrecourse debt, the already stylized and problematic economic-
effect test of the Code section 704(b) regulations becomes impossible to utilize, prompting the 
Treasury to implement safe harbors as to nonrecourse deductions in order to provide greater certain-
ty to taxpayers. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (as amended in 2011). The economic effect test depends on 
the pretense that at some date in the future, the partners’ capital accounts will be meaningful; that is, 
at some future date, partners with negative accounts will have to pay in and partners with positive 
accounts will be rewarded. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2015); Michael J. 
Close & Dan A. Kusnetz, The Final Section 704(b) Regulations: Special Allocations Reach New 
Heights of Complexity, 40 TAX LAW. 307 (1987) (article containing overview of 704(b) regulations, 
as revised in 1986); Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 
VA. TAX REV. 465 (2011) (article discussing evolution of allocation rules and the flaws of the current 
system). If no partner faces the possibility of having to make good on a debt, that ultimate reconcil-
iation becomes impossible and the allocations financed by such nonrecourse debt lack economic 
effect—hence the need for the nonrecourse deduction regulations. If, as proposed in this Article, 
partners did not get basis for debt in the first instance, the allocation problem relating to nonrecourse 
debt would be significantly less important. For example, if a partner were allocated $10,000 of part-
nership-level depreciation deductions but had a $0 basis because all the deductions were financed 
through debt (whether recourse or nonrecourse), the partner would have a much stronger incentive to 
agree to an allocation of $10,000 of income in order to increase basis. 
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thereby potentially reducing inefficiencies tied to choice-of-entity deci-
sions. Even if a rationing system were not enacted, eliminating partner 
access to partnership borrowed basis is low-hanging fruit when it comes 
to incremental partnership tax reform and could even permit repeal of the 
at-risk rules.206 
C. Corporate Taxpayers 
This Article has so far not directly addressed whether and how a 
broad-based rationing system should apply to C corporations. The taxa-
tion of these entities is likely to be most familiar to readers because vir-
tually all name-brand corporations are C corporations.207 C corporations 
are potentially subject to having their earnings taxed twice—once when 
earned (taxed to the entity) and once when distributed as dividends 
                                                            
 206. An aggregate theory of partnerships suggests that the goal should be maintaining parity 
between partnerships that borrow and partners who borrow and then contribute borrowed funds to 
the partnership.  Denying basis to partners for partnership debt arguably moves partnerships too 
close to an entity approach.  See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxa-
tion, 43 GA. L. REV. 717 (2009) (discussing the aggregate and entity theory of partnership and pro-
posing an aggregate-plus theory). Full consideration of the extent to which partnerships should be 
governed by an aggregate approach or an entity approach is beyond the scope of this Article, though 
the incremental-reform proposal suggested in the main text does tacitly utilize an entity approach. 
With respect to partnership debt specifically, use of an entity approach facilitates an administratively 
simpler path to reduce the timing distortion. The combination of partnership tax rules relating to debt 
basis and nonrecourse deductions, when combined with the at-risk rules, already lead indirectly to 
reducing the timing distortion in some cases. If finalized, the proposed regulations would move more 
partnership debt onto the nonrecourse track and, if the at-risk rules were interpreted so as to follow, 
would further mitigate the timing problem. Yet, until a direct, more comprehensive approach is 
enacted, multiple opportunities for gamesmanship and traps for the unwary would remain.  
 In addition (albeit at the risk of raising shades of the likelihood of repayment rationale), the 
debt structures of S corporations and partnerships are closer together than they may at first seem. 
The corporate form generally provides protection to shareholders from corporate creditors. The 
current partnership rules were written with general partnerships in view and well before the wide-
spread use of limited liability companies or other limited liability options for partners and partner-
ships—including, for example, the use of disregarded entities by partners to limit state law liability. 
See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combing the Best Features of a Flawed Business Tax 
Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (chapter dis-
cussing history and evolution of LLCs). While tax regulations have begun to adapt (for example, 
special debt-basis-assignment rules for disregarded entities and the proposed regulations on partner-
ship debt), partners still have multiple avenues to achieve corporate-like insulation against creditors, 
including as to debt qualifying as recourse under the partnership debt rules. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(k) (as amended in 2006) (rules limiting ability to obtain recourse debt status using disregarded 
entities); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2, 79 Fed. Reg. 4826-01 (Jan. 30, 2014). If the at-risk rules were 
repealed and partnership debt treatment moved closer to S corporation debt treatment, it would, of 
course, create pressure for formalistic borrowing by partners to be used within entities. 
 207. It is, however, possible to carry on large business operations inside of the S corporation 
framework. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1041 (2013); Eyal-Cohen, supra note 149. 
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(taxed to the shareholder and nondeductible by the entity).208 As recent 
press coverage has made abundantly clear, multinational corporations 
have a host of methods at their disposal to reduce overall taxation on 
their earnings.209 In addition, the U.S. tax system now imposes a lower 
tax rate on qualifying dividends210 and, of course, corporations financing 
through debt rather than equity are able to deduct the interest, whereas 
dividend payments are not deductible.211 Multinational corporations may 
also be able to borrow from subsidiaries or affiliates operating in low-tax 
jurisdictions, enabling deduction by the parent but low or zero payment 
of tax on the interest inclusion by the subsidiary or affiliate.212 
The sprawling nature of the modern multinational corporation 
makes adapting and expanding a borrowed basis rationing system to such 
behemoths highly difficult. At a minimum, such a system would need to 
take into account the relationships among subsidiaries and affiliates. Ap-
plying a rationing system only at each taxpayer level—that is, at each 
separate C corporation box—would likely provide more fodder for gam-
ing the nonborrowed and borrowed amounts.213 Further, at the level of 
each separate corporation, the net operating loss rules already provide a 
somewhat similar rationing function, yet have been inadequate to prevent 
debt-related tax avoidance by C corporations.214 
The nonborrowed and borrowed amounts could instead be comput-
ed at some entity-plus level, building on, for example, the consolidated 
return rules, and then re-apportioned out to the individual entities.215 
Crafting such an overarching set of rules would be complex to say the 
least, and this Article will not devote space to running through the possi-
ble permutations of such an extensive line-drawing exercise. An alterna-
tive possibility, as will be discussed in the next Part, would be to give up 
                                                            
 208. I.R.C. §§ 11, 1(h) (providing lower rate to certain qualifying dividends). 
 209. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014). 
 210. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). 
 211. I.R.C. § 163; MCMAHON, JR., SIMMONS & MCDANIEL, supra note 47, at 122. 
 212. See supra note 10 and infra note 231 (subpart F considerations). 
 213. A similar issue is raised by tax partnerships, including tiered entity groups, but because 
partnerships are not themselves subject to tax, it may be possible to cut through much of the com-
plexity by denying partners access to debt basis. See supra Part III.B. 
 214. I.R.C. § 172. These rules also apply to all individuals, but because individuals can aggre-
gate net operating losses (NOLs) across activities and also apply NOLs against all income types, 
including wages, the NOL provisions do not already act as a sufficient rationing system, although 
they do clearly provide additional limitations on the ability of taxpayers to use borrowed deductions. 
Embedded within the NOL rules are, for example, further limitations on the ability of individuals to 
treat investment losses and capital losses as NOLs. I.R.C. § 172(d)(2)–(4). The NOL rules provide 
another analogy to the rationing system explored herein and could be mined for additional imple-
mentation ideas. 
 215. See I.R.C. § 1501. 
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precision for a deferral charge, though this would still require adopting 
rules for related corporations. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
This Part examines other possible approaches to limiting the timing 
benefits of borrowed deductions. The first such method would be to deny 
basis in the first place for borrowed dollars and require actual repayment 
of debt principal for basis to arise. The second would remove the exclu-
sion for debt principal, thereby accelerating income. Finally, the Article 
discusses the use of a deferral charge. These three alternatives are evalu-
ated because they represent likely alternative proposals given the existing 
literature in this area, assuming one agrees that doing nothing is not an 
alternative.216 
A. Direct Basis Limitation 
The difficulty with directly denying basis for borrowed cash, as has 
been enumerated by others, lies with the problem of tracing fungible dol-
lars as well as with cost recovery and credit computational difficulties.217 
                                                            
 216. Additional alternatives are, of course, also possible. For example, this Article has not 
addressed the taxation of the lender and whether the treatment of the lender diminishes the problems 
identified in this Article, or whether the lender’s tax treatment could instead be altered to account for 
the timing benefits to the borrower. Using the treatment of lenders to justify or balance the treatment 
of borrowers would, however, raise additional concerns. The first, obvious issue is that lenders and 
borrowers are separate taxpayers and will have a separate basis. The lender has a loan basis obtained 
by providing funds for the use of the borrower. The lender is able to use the basis to offset loan 
principal repayments.  If the lender sells the loan, the lender will use the basis to generate a gain or 
loss; the lender will not, however, be able to amortize the basis it has in the loan.  If repayment is not 
made by the borrower, the lender will be able to take a loss deduction. I.R.C. §§ 165, 166, 1271; see 
also supra notes 150153 and accompanying text (discussing basis in indebtedness of S corporations). 
 Solving a distortion available to one taxpayer by targeting the tax treatment of another taxpayer 
raises equity concerns. When taxpayers are related to each other or are engaged in a common enter-
prise (including tax shelter accommodation), there is, however, greater likelihood that formal tax-
payer boundaries are misleading and should be redrawn. Unsurprisingly, multiple tax rules attempt 
to ensure that the overall tax burden of a particular group has not been reduced through allocation 
gaming by individual members.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2015) 
(substantiality requirement for partnership allocations).  The lender and borrower relationship does 
involve a common investment but does not require a shared business relationship, such as is experi-
enced by partners in a partnership or corporate shareholders in a corporation. See Bradley T. Borden, 
Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements, 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 245 (2010) 
(discussing classification of business relationships under the Code and economic theory). In the case 
of sham debt, where the lender is essentially an accommodation party, lender-side solutions would 
be most easy to justify.  Finding a lender-side solution for the commonplace timing benefit high-
lighted in this Article would be more problematic. Alternatives that focus on the creditor side of the 
transaction should be explored, but it is beyond the scope of this Article to do so in greater detail. 
 217. See DODGE, FLEMING, JR. & PERONI, supra note 43, at 451–54. See also Coven, supra 
note 15. 
 
78 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:33 
The tracing problem can be illustrated by returning briefly to Inves-
tor B and Asset Y of Example 2 above. Assume that a rule applies 
providing that the tax deduction is available only if Asset Y is purchased 
with nonborrowed dollars. Investor B could get around this problem by 
borrowing the $100,000 to fund some other expenses or asset purchases, 
including personal consumption expenses, and then buying Asset Y with 
nonborrowed dollars. Because dollars are fungible, Investor B will still 
have, for all practical purposes, borrowed money to purchase Y. Denying 
basis for debt-financed assets and operating costs would require an elab-
orate combination of tracing and apportionment rules to determine 
whether a particular item is funded with borrowed dollars. 
The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) does contain templates for 
such tracing rules. In addition to the technical rules outlined in Part II, 
the Code contains a miscellany of rules relating to debt principal and 
debt interest that rely for their operation on deeming particular tax bene-
fits to be derived from particular loans. For example, the Code requires 
tracing debt used to purchase bonds bearing tax-exempt interest in order 
to deny deductibility of the interest on such debt.218 As explained above, 
regulations governing tax partnerships contain rules that treat certain de-
ductions as allocable to nonrecourse debt; the label in turn triggers vari-
ous restrictions on the assignment of those deductions to the partners.219 
Rules that attempt to trace tax benefits to particular loans will al-
most certainly suffer from coverage gaps and complexity.220 A system 
that simply eliminated the ability to borrow basis would not only need 
rules for determining whether particular tax benefits were traceable to 
debt but would also need rules for ensuring that payments on debt are not 
themselves traceable to new debt; otherwise, the basis gained by pay-
ment would be tainted. 
Simply eliminating borrowed basis directly instead of acting on the 
benefits would also have the effect of causing some U.S. dollars to have 
                                                                                                                                     
 A related, but more workable, alternative would be to disallow deductions until debt is repaid. 
Such a proposal, along with suggested approaches to the tracing issue, has been advanced by Profes-
sor McMahon, Jr., supra note 15. The deferral proposal made in this Article attempts to limit the 
tracing problem by expanding the at-risk mechanism and focusing on the earning of offsetting basis 
rather than on the repayment of the underlying debt. See supra Part III. 
 218. I.R.C. § 265; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T (as amended in 1997) (allocating interest 
expenses across capital expenditures for purposes of applying passive activity loss rules and limita-
tions on nonbusiness interest deductions). 
 219. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d) (as amended in 2011). 
 220. See McMahon, Jr., supra note 15, at 1120 (noting the limits of drawing on Code section 
265(2) for tracing rules for his deferral proposal); Philip D. Oliver, Section 265(2): A Counterpro-
ductive Solution to a Nonexistent Problem, 40 TAX L. REV. 351 (1985); David J. Shakow, Confront-
ing the Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L. REV. 1, 19, 44–46 (1987). 
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a basis different than their current value.221 Having U.S. cash (whether in 
physical or digital form) with a basis of $0 or some other amount differ-
ent from face amount would raise consequences that would be confusing, 
to say the least. The IRS recently ruled that virtual currency, such as 
bitcoin, should be treated as property, with all the ramifications that car-
ries with it, including requiring taxpayers who use bitcoin to make pur-
chases to treat that as an exchange of the bitcoin for the purchased item, 
triggering any gain or loss inherent in the bitcoin.222 Imagine trying to 
apply such a system to U.S. dollars. Apart from the practical difficulties, 
the ripple effects in the Code would be astounding, as an argument can 
be made that a significant portion of the Code’s structure is dedicated to 
ensuring that U.S. cash tracks basis equal to its face amount.223 
Solving tax distortions through denying basis for borrowed dollars 
would also trigger a need to reconsider the computational rules for cost 
recovery deductions, various credits, and any other tax benefits tied to 
tax basis. For example, depreciation schedules run on assumptions about 
the economic decline in value from the purchase price of an asset.224 And 
the tax system assumes that in taxable transactions starting basis and 
purchase price are the same number.225 It would, of course, be possible to 
redesign the systems, but it would require the addition of a second meas-
uring concept. Once a secondary concept is needed, and given the other 
complexities of attempting direct elimination of borrowed basis, one may 
as well use an overarching intermediary concept, such as the 
nonborrowed basis proposed in the prior part. 
B. Accelerating Basis Inclusion 
A second alternative to a system focused on rationing the benefits 
of borrowed basis would be a system accelerating the substitution of 
nonborrowed basis for borrowed basis. Because the benefits of the tim-
ing distortion relate to the ability of taxpayers to pay for deductions with 
borrowed basis while delaying the time when the income available to pay 
the debt will be earned, a possible alternative is to force earned income at 
the same time that basis is borrowed.226 That is, receipt of borrowed 
money could be taxed and repayment of the debt could be deductible.227 
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A borrowing inclusion would help resolve the problem of cancella-
tion of indebtedness income and the various exceptions to inclusion re-
quired to deal with insolvent and bankrupt taxpayers.228 The tax would be 
collected at a time when taxpayers had the resources to borrow cash to 
make the tax payment; under the current system, the government must 
instead attempt to collect from taxpayers unable (or unwilling) to repay 
their debts.229 Taxpayers who failed to repay on debt that had already 
been included in income would simply lose their repayment deduction, 
thus ending the need to measure insolvency or determine eligibility for a 
similar exception. For pass-through entities, such as partnerships, the 
inclusion of borrowed funds could be allocated directly to the partners 
(though still subject to the broad distributive share restrictions, such as 
substantial economic effect) without the need for more complicated as-
signment of borrowed basis.230 In the international context, instituting a 
borrowing inclusion would help limit the ability of U.S. businesses to 
defer tax by borrowing from cross-border entities.231 A borrowing inclu-
sion could also more generally counter the current system’s tax prefer-
ences for debt financing since owing a tax at the time of borrowing 
would likely act as a disincentive. 
Requiring inclusion in income for borrowed dollars and allowing 
deduction for repayment would, however, still cause a timing distortion, 
albeit one that would be more likely to operate in the Treasury’s favor. 
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Once such a rule were in place, taxpayers would also no doubt use their 
new ability to accelerate income at will to craft new tax reduction tech-
niques such as, for example, borrowing money in order to have income 
to offset expiring net operating losses. A borrowing inclusion would put 
more pressure on the line between basis-infused debt (includible in in-
come) and contingent, basis-free obligations (not includible in in-
come).232 Exceptions for consumer debt would also have to be made, not 
just for the obvious political reasons, but also because consumer debt 
generally funds either nondeductible consumer costs or a select, congres-
sionally blessed set of deductions.233 
A borrowing inclusion introduced for purposes of ending borrowed 
deductions would have much to recommend it, but it would also intro-
duce new uncertainties. Even if restricted to business and investment 
debt, such an inclusion would, almost certainly, be distasteful to business 
interests and to Congress. It would almost certainly be decried as puni-
tive given that there is no wealth increase.234 Further, the constitutionality 
of such an approach has never been tested.235 It would also be argued, 
correctly, that a rule requiring tax to be paid on borrowing would be 
over-inclusive with respect to timing because it would apply to all busi-
ness or investment borrowing, even if not traceable to tax benefits. Tai-
loring a borrowing inclusion more narrowly would raise the same tracing 
and administrative problems discussed in the immediately preceding sec-
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tion.236 While a broad-based borrowing inclusion merits further scholarly 
attention, a broad-based rationing system would be more accurate. A de-
ferral charge, discussed next, would provide a rough but more practicable 
alternative. 
C. Deferral Toll Charge 
Borrowing money requires paying the lender for the use of that 
money, whether or not the label “interest” always gets attached to that 
payment.237 When taxpayers finance deductions with debt—when they, 
in effect, borrow basis from the government—there is no corresponding 
interest-like payment to the government.238 The main proposal of this 
Article has focused on forcing a match between borrowed deductions 
with the receipt of nonborrowed basis. Such a focus has the advantage of 
operating through an expansion of an existing set of rules and also pro-
vides significant, though far from perfect, opportunities for precision in 
eliminating the timing advantage.239 At the same time, a broad-based ra-
tioning system would clearly require significant changes to the current 
system and would be administratively difficult to implement both with 
respect to C corporations and also with respect to tax partnerships, if 
partners were still assigned basis for partnership debt. A simpler, if less 
accurate, alternative would be for the government to charge for the tim-
ing benefit through imposition of a deferral charge on business and in-
vestment activities.240 The use of “toll” charges to take back timing ad-
vantages is fairly common in the Code, though such charges often apply 
to more narrowly defined situations.241 
Even a deferral charge would still require taxpayers to report on the 
amount of debt principal. Because the concern is the debt financing of 
tax benefits, multiple rules would be required to determine the extent of 
the taxpayer’s borrowed tax benefits.242 If a rough timing remedy were 
enacted, it would, however, be possible to make further rough-justice 
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assumptions in calculating the amount of the charge. For example, for-
mulas could be used to assign debt and tax benefits of subsidiaries to a 
corporate parent. A deferral charge could also be used as a substitute for 
a broader-based rationing system with respect only to certain taxpayers; 
for example, a deferral charge system could apply to multinational C 
corporations instead of a more administratively complex rationing sys-
tem. 
CONCLUSION 
The tax system’s treatment of both debt interest and debt principal 
is problematic. This Article emphasizes the need to reexamine the ability 
of taxpayers to borrow basis to fund tax benefits and presents four possi-
ble reform alternatives. An overarching requirement that the benefits of 
deductions and credits be rationed to account for borrowed basis has the 
attraction of being better tailored to the distortion but would be more 
complex to implement.243  The government could instead enact a more 
rough-hewn but arguably more serviceable interest-like charge on tax-
payers who borrow basis.  Simply denying basis for borrowed cash 
would likely be even more administratively complex than attempting a 
rationing system; accelerating inclusion of borrowed money would intro-
duce new distortions. 
Even if there is skepticism regarding the benefits to be achieved by 
solving the timing distortions associated with borrowed basis, the failures 
of the tax system in providing consistent, principled handling of debt 
principal are readily apparent. The tangle of current tax rules regarding 
borrowed basis presented in this Article represents a portion of the co-
nundrum of dealing with obligations. This Article focused only on sim-
ple cash (and cash equivalent) borrowing; beneath this is another convo-
luted layer to explore, including, for example, the contradictions and 
problems associated with taxing contingent obligations, debt-like equity, 
and debt-like derivatives. Moving design focus toward the underlying 
timing temptation provides a starting point for a more coherent approach 
to debt—one that could pave the way for simplifications in the tax rules, 
reductions in deadweight costs associated with tax avoidance, and inno-




 243. The examples in this Article focused on deductions; for a discussion of the problem of 
debt-financed credits, see McMahon, Jr., supra note 15. 
